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JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT
This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78A-2-102(3)(j).
STATEMENT OF ISSUE ON APPEAL
Did the trial court commit legal error in denying Appellants' motions to intervene under
Rule 24(a), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure? This Court reviews a trial court's denial of a
motion to intervene under Rule 24(a) de novo. In re Marriage of Gonzalez, 2000 UT 28, ^f 16,
1 P.3d 1074. This issue was preserved in the trial court at R. 15219-15528, R. 15229-15322,
R. 15264-15282, R. 15283-15287, R. 15294-15323, R. 15630-15637 and R. 15704-15711.
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, ORDINANCES AND RULES
Utah Code Ann. § 75-7-405(3):
The settlor of a charitable trust, among others, may maintain a
proceeding to enforce the trust.
Rule 24(a), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure:
Upon timely application anyone shall be permitted to intervene in an
action: (1) when a statute confers an unconditional right to intervene; or
(2) when the applicant claims an interest relating to the property or transaction which is the subject of the action and he is so situated that the
disposition of the action may as a practical matter impair or impede his
ability to protect that interest, unless the applicant's interest is adequately
represented by existing parties.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This appeal presents one of many issues arising out of the trial court's reformation and
continuing administration of a religious charitable trust known as the United Effort Plan Trust.
The present issue centers not on the substance of the trial court's actions, but on whether and

under what circumstances interested persons can obtain party status to challenge the
administration of a charitable trust. The trial court ruled that no one besides the state can
participate as a party under any circumstances. (Corrected Ruling and Order on Pending
Motions, July 17, 2009 (R. 16381-83), copy attached as Addendum A.)
Appellants respectfully ask this Court to reverse that ruling. Appellants consecrated,
administered, and exercised stewardships over the real property that comprises the Trust's
assets. The appellant Bishops also exercised the religious management over Trust assets which
is an integral and indeed core part of FLDS religious practice. Appellants therefore have a
special interest in those assets beyond the general interest a taxpayer or the public at large
shares in the proper administration of a charitable trust. Rule 24 of the Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure, properly applied to the facts of this case, allows Appellants to obtain party status in
an action involving ongoing state administration of the Trust and disposition of Trust assets.
Reversing the trial court's ruling will allow Appellant Bishops and Church members to
participate as parties in the trial court proceedings (to the extent there are further proceedings
following this Court's resolution of the substantive issues relating to the trial court's
reformation and ongoing administration of the Trust in related Case No. 20090859-SC). It will
also provide necessary clarification in this important area of trust law for future proceedings
involving charitable trusts.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
A.

Appellants" Special Interest in the UEP Trust and Specific Trust Properties

Appellants Willie Jessop, Dan Johnson and Merlin Jessop (^Appellant Church
Members") are members in good standing of the Fundamentalist Church of Jesus Christ of

Latter-l)a\ Saints (the "1;1 DSt hurelfl. (1< n2<U I S J I M

Nppcllanl I \ ic Jells is ,m

nrduincd Bishop nil" ibe 11 I)S (lnjivb \\\\\\ responsibility for Church members residing in
Hildale, Utah and Colorado City, Arizona. (R. 15249-14256) Appellant James Oler is also an
ordained Bishop for the FLDS Church, with responsibility lor l "hureh members residing in
Bountiful, British G : >lumbii i, Canada (R 1525 7 15263)
x s , )lle Qf t | i e

core

t e n e t s of their religion, Appellants believe they have been

commanded by God, through a Prophet, to establish God's Kingdom on i.arih m these "latter
days.''
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r.iithtul Church fucinfxTs consecrate (heir property, services, time and talents to the FLDS
Church, and requires that the Bishops of the Church in turn grant "stewardships" over
consecrated property to provide for the good of the whole commun 11\, I R. 131W-13 21 Kl
1322^ i l'hh commandment is knnwn :\K tin, I i\w of i 'oii^critinn and Stewardship or the Holy
United Order. (R. 13198)1

]

The doctrinal basis of this commandment is found in a b x :»k the FI OS consider h : » be
Holy Scripture, the Doctrine & Covenants ("0 & C"):
s

And behold, thou wilt remember the poor, and consecrate of thy properties
for their support that which thou hast to impart, unto them.,, with a covenant and a.
deed which cannot be broken.
And inasmuch as ye impart of your substance unto the poor, ye will do it unto
me; and they shall be laid before the bishop of my church and his counselors, two of
the elders, or high priests, such as he shall appoint or has appointed and set apart for
that purpose.
32>
^ 1 ( j ii shall come to pass, that after they are laid before the bishop of my
church, and after that he has received these testimonies concerning the consecration
of the properties of my church, that they cannot be taken from the church, agreeable
to my commandments, every man shall be made accountable unto me. a steward
o

The United Effort Plan Trust ("UEP Trust" or "Trust") was organized as the secular
instrumentality for pursuing these religious objectives, enabling faithful members of the
Church to organize their communal life in accordance with the Law of Consecration and
Stewardship. (R. 13202-13203) Thus the Declaration of Trust states that the Trust was
created and exists "to preserve and advance the religious doctrines and goals" of the FLDS
Church, and that the Trust is to be administered "consistent with its religious purpose to

over his own property, or that which he has received by consecration, as much as is
sufficient for himself and family.
33.
And again, if there shall be properties in the hands of the church, or any
individuals of it, more than is necessary for their support after this first consecration,
which is a residue to be consecrated unto the bishop, it shall be kept to administer to
those who have not, from time to time, that every man who has need may be amply
supplied and receive according to his wants.
34.
Therefore, the residue shall be kept in my storehouse, to administer to the
poor and the needy, as shall be appointed by the high council of the church, and the
bishop and his council;
35.
And for the purpose of purchasing lands for the public benefit of the church,
and building houses of worship, and building up the New Jerusalem which is
hereafter to be revealed36.
That my covenant people may be gathered in one in that day when I shall
come to my temple. And this I do for the salvation of my people.
37.
And it shall come to pass, that he that sinneth and repenteth not shall be cast
out of the church, and shall not receive again that which he has consecrated unto the
poor and the needy of my church, or in other words, unto m e 38.

For inasmuch as ye do it unto the least of these, ye do it unto me.

39.
For it shall come to pass, that which I spake by the mouths of my prophets
shall be fulfilled; for I will consecrate of the riches of those who embrace my gospel
among the Gentiles unto the poor of my people who are of the house of Israel.
D. & C. 42:30-39. See also D. &. C. 83:5-6.
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provide for \l LI)S| I liuivh members according lu thai V« nil ,md iheii mvds. insofar as their
')

wants art? |iist (Diaiinnc and < 'i" anaiits, Section 82:17-21)." (R. 13223, 13225)"
Properties consecrated to the Trust historically were administered through Church
leaders, such as Appellant Bishops, whose calling is to grant stew aiiisinps u\ ei a mil < iiherw ise
make use oj llic uiiisecraletl pmperiir* in miM ihc ""just \\ ant ^ and needs" of faithful Church
incmbcrs. (R. 15250-15251; R. 15258-15259) Substantial Trust landholdings exist in both
communities served by Appellant Bishops. (R. 15252-15253. K I *^2y^ h2oln Appellant
Church Members were > a , :\.^ ^n.
t >t

property, iiu Inc. a.. .

, , . .n ,s v

x

* ;shi}> lv, •

i)S Hisliop1- OUT

»r\^ v known as the Berry Knoll Farm. (R. 15202, 15208,

15214)

* \rc :vferenced in this Trust language states:
17 And you are to be equal, or in other words, you are to have equal claims on ,a^
properties, for the benefit of managing the concerns of your stewardships, even
man according to his wants and his needs, inasmuch as his wants are just—
18 And all this for the benefit of the church of the living God, that every man
may improve upon his talent, that every man may gain other talents, yea, even an
hundred fold, to be cast into the Lord's storehouse, to become the common
property of the whole church—
19 Every man seeking the interest of his neighbor, and doing all things with an
eye single to the glory of God.
20 This order 1 have appointed to be an everlasting border unto you, and unto
your successors, inasmuch as you sin not.
21 And the soul that sins against this covenant, and hardeneth his heart against it,
shall be dealt with according to the laws of my church, and shall be delivered over
to the bufferings of Satan until the day of redemption
D & C Section 82: 17-21.

5

Appellants have used Trust lands, including the Berry Knoll farm, for over three
decades to help provide for the just physical wants and needs of the people. (R. 15202, 15208,
15214) Once consecrated to the Trust in the 1980s, the Bishops of the FLDS Church began
granting priesthood stewardship of parcels of Berry Knoll to various FLDS priesthood holders
for the benefit of the congregations. {Id.) The sacred charge given those men was to improve
the consecrated land by turning it into a working, productive farm, and they did so by planting,
harvesting, grazing, and irrigating, using the consecrated land to benefit the FLDS faithful.
{Id.) Based on the efforts of the Bishops and the people to whom they granted sacred
stewardships, Berry Knoll became a part of the Church Storehouse from which the Bishops
distribute food and resources to help satisfy the just physical wants and needs of the FLDS
members. {Id.; see also R. 15260) Moreover, Appellants, as all FLDS faithful, regard Berry
Knoll as a sacred site of a future temple. (R. 15202, 15208, 15214) Thus, Berry Knoll has
provided, and, so long as it is not sold, could continue to provide, for the just wants and needs
of the people, both temporally and spiritually. (R. 15252, 15260)
Appellants believe, and the language and context of the Trust as a whole make it clear,
that any determination of "just wants" is fundamentally a religious determination, and that their
granting, receiving, and continued use of stewardships is a solemn right and duty bearing on
their exaltation in the hereafter. (R. 13223-13229; R. 15202, 15208, 15214; R. 15250, 15258)
To this end, the Declaration of Trust provides:
The United Effort Plan is the effort and striving on the part of
Church members toward the Holy United Order. This central principle of
the Church requires the gathering together of faithful Church members on
consecrated and sacred lands to establish as one pure people the Kingdom
of God on Earth under the guidance of Priesthood leadership.
-6-

(R. 13224)
B.

The Trial Court's Actions Affecting Appellants' Special Interests

On May 26, 2005, the Attorney General of the State of Utah filed a Petition asking the
district court to remove or suspend the then-Trustees of the 1998 Restated Trust. (R. 1-118)
The Petition requested "an immediate order suspending the authority and power of the current
trustees pending a final decision by the Court on their removal and appointing an interim
special fiduciary for the limited purpose of preserving the assets of the trust," along with other
relief. (R. 2)4
On June 16, 2005, the Third District Court, Judge Deno Himonas presiding, entered an
Order re Preliminary Injunction Appointing a Special Fiduciary and Suspending the Trustees.
(R. 512-518) Bruce Wisan was "appointed as Special Fiduciary on a limited basis" as
requested by the Attorney General. (R. 16-17) On September 2, 2005, the Third District

The procedural background of the trial court action preceding its decision to "reform"
the Trust is set forth in the trial court's Memorandum Decision dated December 13, 2005,
R. 3452-3480.
4

At precisely the same time, various persons describing themselves as "Private Beneficiaries"
petitioned the trial court for the same relief. (R. 119-138) These "Private Beneficiaries"
proceeded to file various pleadings, including a Joinder in the Utah Attorney General's Motion
for Preliminary Injunction (R. 430-434) and a Notice of Proposed Substitute Trustees and
Request for Partial Reformation of Trust. (R. 567-570) Interestingly, the trial court entertained
the pleadings of these "Private Beneficiaries," as well as other "Interested Parties," who include
well-known ex- and anti-FLDS agitators and persons who sued the trust for alleged
mistreatment by Church leaders, and even referred to them as "parties," in the core proceedings
involving the "reformation" of the Trust, discussed below. (R. 3452-3454) Only when
Appellant Church Members sought to participate on equal terms with these "Private
Beneficiaries" and "Interested Parties" did the trial court conclude that only the Attorneys
General have "standing" and seek to "correct and clarify certain prior statements it made"
concerning these persons' status as "parties." (R. 14063, 14081-14082)

7.

Court, Judge Denise Lindberg presiding, entered an Order on Procedure to Appoint Trustees
and Expansion of Special Fiduciary's Authority, which expanded the Special Fiduciary's
authority to include the following:
(a)
File lawsuits to recover or protect Trust property as such
action is deemed reasonable, prudent, and/or necessary in the discretion of
the Fiduciary;
(b)
Manage, lease, or rent the property of the Trust as such action
is deemed reasonable, prudent, and/or necessary in the discretion of the
Fiduciary;
(c)
Defend against the Tort Lawsuits which have been filed
against the Trust as such action is deemed reasonable, prudent, and/or
necessary in the discretion of the Fiduciary;
(d)

Work toward the payment of the Trust's property taxes;

(e)
Request and collect money for the payment of taxes from
persons residing on Trust property;
(f)
Take action to remove persons who refuse to pay their fair
share of property taxes from Trust property; and
(g)
Delay paying property taxes for one or more parcels of Trust
property if the Special Fiduciary is unable to raise sufficient funds from
persons residing on such property to enable the payment of property taxes
for such property.
(R. 1996-2001)
On December 13, 2005, the trial court issued a Memorandum Decision in which it
determined that the UEP Trust could properly be "reformed" using the cypres doctrine, such
that the court-appointed Special Fiduciary rather than the ecclesiastical leaders of the FLDS
Church would administer the UEP Trust to meet the "just wants and needs" of putative Trust
beneficiaries in accordance with allegedly "neutral," non-religious principles. (R. 3452-3480)
In the Memorandum Decision, the trial court invited proposals for the reformation of the 1998

_c_

Restated Trust. (Id.,ffif23, 24, 38 56 and 63) On October 25, 2006, the trial court created the
Reformed Trust. (R. 6537)5
C.

Administration of the Reformed Trust Becomes Hostile to the FLDS, and
Disposition of Trust Lands Causes Economic and Spiritual Devastation

Attorneys for the Special Fiduciary have aptly characterized the Special Fiduciary's
administration of the Reformed Trust as a "sociological and psychological war with the
beneficiaries of the Trust." (R. 11660-11879, at 117-2, 11724) Other court filings by the
Special Fiduciary refer to the determination of FLDS Church members' "just wants and needs"
in accordance with ecclesiastical determinations informed by Holy Scripture and divine
revelation as "the whim of leadership;" to the FLDS Church's religious beliefs and practices in
making such determinations as "discriminat[ing] on the basis of religion" and operating "in a
religiously discriminatory manner;" and to FLDS Church members as "saboteurs." (R. 1388013920, at 13381, 13385-13386)
The devastation caused by this "war" from Appellants' perspective is epitomized in the
Special Fiduciary's announced intention to sell Trust properties that hold special economic,
social, historical and spiritual significance for the FLDS community, including the Harker
Farm, the Berry Knoll Farm and the FLDS Temple in Eldorado, Texas. (R. 11145-11590) The
Fiduciary's stated purpose for selling these properties is to "resolve the current cash crunch
problem" - a multi-million dollar obligation owed to the Special Fiduciary's legal, accounting

5

Because the Record on Appeal does not include a copy of the Reformed Declaration of Trust,
but merely a "Not Found" notation at the page cited, a copy of the Reformed Declaration of
Trust is included as Addendum B to this brief.

-Q-

and other functionaries. (Id., % 157) But the loss of the properties would cause Appellants
substantial economic, social and spiritual damage.
Berry Knoll Farm has long been of central economic and social value to the FLDS
Church as a part of the prophetic vision and divine command that the Short Creek area will
"become a garden spot of the west" and sustain the faithful members of the community
through consecration of its bounty to the Bishop's Storehouse. (R. 13830-13832) Berry Knoll
Farm also has deep religious and historical significance to Church members generally; they
believe that the location of a temple site is divinely revealed to Church leaders, and that as a
result of a specific prophecy Berry Knoll is a sacred site upon which a temple will be
constructed, even if the Church leadership is "scattered," so long as they remain faithful. (Id.)
The Special Fiduciary proposes to sell the property to a competing religious group with a
competing truth-claim as to its sacred status.
Upon learning of these proposed sales, FLDS Church members, acting through their
representatives, Appellant Church Members, sought to prevent the sale of consecrated Trust
property. (R. 13193-13195). The trial court ruled that Appellant Church Members lacked
standing, and disqualified the FLDS Church's long-time counsel. (R. 14063-14085) That
ruling is the subject of the related pending appeal, Snow Christens en & Martineau et at v.
Judge Denise P. Lindberg, Supreme Court No. 20080928.
The Special Fiduciary thereafter sought approval of the trial court for the sale of Berry
Knoll. (R. 13553-13555) Appellant Church Members opposed that Motion as well.
(R. 13826-13859) The Utah Attorney General moved to continue a hearing on the proposed
sale, scheduled for November 14, 2008, and all interested parties agreed to a stay of litigation
-10-

and a general stand-down so that discussions could be pursued toward a negotiated resolution
of the underlying issues that would not involve further sales of consecrated and sacred Trust
property. (R. 14623)
Four full days of mediation, utilizing the services of Judge Paul Cassell as the mediator,
ensued. After these and other extensive negotiations, the FLDS Church and the Utah Attorney
General reached broad agreement on material settlement terms, including payment of the
Special Fiduciary's outstanding fees and other Trust obligations, without the need to sell Trust
property. (R. 15652-15661) On June 22, 2009, the trial court rejected those settlement terms
on the basis that the proposed settlement "decidedly favors the FLDS Church and its adherents
. . . . " (R. 16424-16431, at 16425) The court continued:
[T]he Utah A.G./FLDS proposal is troubling in that it potentially provides
for unconstitutional distribution of Trust property to an organization that
will likely use it in support of an illegal practice [polygamy]. Such use of
Trust property would violate principles of Trust law governing charitable
trusts, and would make the UEP Trust fail.
(Id at 16426-16427)
Having rejected settlement efforts, the trial court ordered a form of "public hearing" on
the Special Fiduciary's proposed sale of the Berry Knoll Farm. (Id. at 14628; R. 16415-16423)
At the "public hearing," while participation was allowed from a variety of perspectives, the
FLDS Church and its members were allotted only five speakers with five minutes each to
address the issues. (R. 16417) None of the speakers was sworn, no cross examination was
allowed, no evidence was received, and there was not even any concrete proposal for the sale
of the property. (R. 16448) Included among the comments at the "public hearing" were the
claims of disgruntled former FLDS Church members who felt they had been mistreated by

11

FLDS Church leadership in the administration of the UEP Trust decades ago, and who
implored the trial court to grant them relief from the Church's actions. {See, e.g., Id., pp. 3537? 40-44, 44-46, 47-50, 50-52, 53-56)
Following the "public hearing," the trial court issued a written decision authorizing the
sale of the Berry Knoll Farm to the highest bidder. (R. 16483-16491)
D.

Appellants' Efforts To Formally Intervene.

After having their initial efforts to block the sale of Berry Knoll rejected for lack of
"standing," and realizing their efforts to resolve either the specific Berry Knoll dispute or the
more global situation through mediation would be unavailing, Appellant Church Members
sought to formally intervene in the action pursuant to Rule 24(a), Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure. (R. 15201-15232) Appellant Bishops also sought to intervene in their capacities as
FLDS Bishops. (R. 15249-15287)
. The trial court denied Appellants' Motions to Intervene. (R. 16376) Based on its denial
of the Motions to Intervene, the court also denied Intervenors' Motion to Stay Proceedings, to
Replace Special Fiduciary and to Enjoin Further Actions of Special Fiduciary Pending
Evidentiary Hearing, and Intervenors' Motion for Expedited Discovery, without addressing the
merits of those motions. (R. 16377)
E.

The Attorneys General's And Other Parties' Failure Adequately To
Represent Appellants' Interests

The Utah Attorney General was quoted in the Associated Press on May 26, 2005 as
saying, "in stepping in today, we are protecting members of the FLDS church." (Addendum C
["Shurtleff wants to freeze FLDS trust fund"]) He was also quoted as saying that the trustees

had "violated their duty to church members... I'm trying to protect them." (Id.)
Unfortunately, however sincere the Attorney General's words, his actions have consistently
fallen short.
When the trial court established the Reformed Trust, it identified securing housing for
Trust beneficiaries as a primary objective in meeting their "just wants and needs," and further
made it clear that decisions concerning disposition of Trust assets were to be made without
regard to religious belief or practice. (App. A, Reformed Declaration of Trust Recital E.3,
Sections 4.1, 6.5) In his disposition of Trust housing, the Fiduciary has focused on securing
housing for non- and anti-FLDS persons, at the expense of FLDS Church members. Numerous
examples of this practice are set forth in the record. (R. 15329-15433, at 15330-15337, 1536015423) In his disposition of other Trust property, the Fiduciary has similarly acted in a manner
that consistently discriminates in favor of disgruntled former FLDS members but that is
contrary to the best interests of the vast majority of Trust beneficiaries; again, numerous
examples are set forth in the record. (R. 15337-15340) The advisory board has consistently
been comprised of anti-FLDS activists, and the Special Fiduciary employs assistants in
Colorado City who are also anti-FLDS. One of them has been convicted of criminal trespass
against the FLDS, and the other—along with the Special Fiduciary himself—are awaiting trial
in Arizona on similar charges.
The trial court's initial charge to the Fiduciary also included a charge to defend the
Trust against lawsuits brought against the Trust by third parties. (R. 1996-2001) The
Fiduciary's actions in carrying out that responsibility included engaging in collusion with the
plaintiffs' attorneys in fraudulently procuring an $8.8 million default judgment against the

prior Trustees, which actions are the subject of a separate fraud action pending in Third District
Court, The Fundamentalist Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints v. Wisan, Case No.
080918199.
One particularly disturbing aspect of the Fiduciary's procuring the default judgment is
the fact that upon its being granted, the Fiduciary's counsel and the Hooles, who have assiduously pursued litigation against the Trust on behalf of disgruntled former Church members,
are observed on the courtroom video as exchanging "high fives." (R. 15340) The reason is
that the judgment allowed the Fiduciary subsequently to execute on additional valuable property that has never been in the Trust, the so-called Harker Farm, and divert the resources of that
property away from the FLDS community and toward support of the Fiduciary's war on the
community. (R. 15340-15341)
The Fiduciary's activities were supposed to be "subject to and limited by the availability
of funds in the Trust estate to reimburse the Special Fiduciary for the costs, fees and other
Court approved expenses incurred by the Special Fiduciary and his attorneys." (R. 546-554)
Yet with no source of income and operating under an order which prohibited him from
incurring any debt, as of the summer of 2008, Mr. Wisan had spent $3,532,408 of Trust funds,
including $333,484 in paid Fiduciary fees and $1,692342 in paid attorney's fees. It had
outstanding debt owed to the Fiduciary of $193,277 and to his attorneys of $777,091.
Shockingly, these exorbitant expenses and debts were incurred without paying the
Trust's property taxes. (R. 15347-15350, 15431-15433) Wisan now reports that the Trust
currently has debt in excess of $2.1 million—a large portion of which apparently was incurred
after the court-ordered stand-down in this matter, none of which has been approved by the

Court. (R. 17668-17675) The debt includes payment for the unsuccessful criminal defense of
one of Wisan's agents, Isaac Wyler, in "staking out" and changing the locks on occupied
residences so they can be made available for non-FLDS and anti-FLDS occupants, in violation
of the property and privacy rights of the FLDS occupants. Wisan himself has also been
charged for his complicity in these unlawful acts and seeks to charge the Trust for his defense
as well. (R. 15332-15336, 15343-15347, 15393-15423)
Despite the claim of waste of assets made at the inception of this action, the assets of the
Trust grew under the prior management. In contrast, under the administration of the Special
Fiduciary—who was appointed to stop alleged waste—they have been dissipated and
consumed at an average exceeding $1 million per year. (R. 15347-15350) The persons who
have benefited most from the Fiduciary's management are those whom the FLDS Church, in
the constitutional exercise of its religious autonomy, deemed to be unworthy of continued
participation in the Trust and who now actively promote the eradication not only of the Trust
but also of the Church. (R. 15343-15347)
Thus, as the case currently stands, the trial court has taken over the Trust and placed it
under the allegedly secular administration of a "state-ordained bishop" contrary to the plain
language of the Trust and the settlor's clear intent. It has compounded this original error by
endorsing decisions that are decidedly not religion-neutral, but that instead discriminate against
Appellants and the FLDS Church. It has entertained a request by the Special Fiduciary to sell a
unique and irreplaceable Trust asset, the Berry Knoll farm, without receiving evidence or
testimony under oath and subject to cross examination.
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Yet when the FLDS objected that the Special Fiduciary was decimating the Trust, thait
he was actively discriminating against FLDS on the basis of religion, and that he was
demanding that they pay to finance his self-proclaimed "war" on them, the district court held
that leaders and members of the FLDS Church, even if they have a "special interest" in Trust
assets distinct from members of the public at large, lack legal standing to challenge any of its
actions.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The trial court erred in denying Appellants' Motions to Intervene. Appellants meet the
requirements for intervention as of right under Rule 24(a). The trial court's erroneous ruling to
the contrary was based on its conclusion that, as a matter of "black letter law," putative
beneficiaries of a charitable trust "have no right to make claims upon such trusts." The facts
proffered by Appellants, which must be accepted as pled for purposes of determining their
eligibility to intervene, show that they qualify for an established exception to this "black letter
law," set forth in the Restatement and numerous cases, because they have a particularized
connection to the Trust and the specific Trust property, which creates a "special interest" in the
Trust distinct from that of members of the public at large.
According to the Restatement of Trusts, a multi-factor approach should be used to
determine whether a party has a special interest giving rise to standing to enforce a charitable
trust. The relevant factors include (1) extraordinary nature of acts complained of and remedy
sought; (2) presence of fraud or misconduct on part of charity or its directors; (3) attorney
general's availability or effectiveness; (4) nature of benefited class and its relationship to
charity; and (5) subjective, case-specific circumstances. Restatement (Second) of Trusts § 391.
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In this exceptional case, all of the foregoing factors weigh strongly in favor of standing.
Unless this Court recognizes Appellants' standing, Appellants and the thousands of FLDS
Church members they represent, who are the intended beneficiaries of the Trust, will have no
effective voice through party status as the district court determines the fate of their property in
what would then become a non-adversary process. That would have both legal and public
policy consequences. It is important that this Court correct the trial court's legal error regarding Utah law governing charitable trusts, and particularly so in this context, involving as it
does fundamental questions about the nature and extent of state power to reform and administer religious charitable trusts where those with the most particularized, special relationship to
unique trust assets strongly object to the non-religious (if not anti-religious) administration.
ARGUMENT
I.

THE TRIAL COURT FAILED TO ANALYZE APPELLANTS5 MOTIONS
TO INTERVENE IN LIGHT OF THE APPLICABLE STANDARDS
UNDER RULE 24(a), UTAH R. CIV. P.
Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 24(a) provides that a party may intervene as of right

"[u]pon timely application . . . when the applicant claims an interest relating to the property or
transaction which is the subject of the action and he is so situated that the disposition of the
action may as a practical matter impair or impede his ability to protect that interest, unless the
applicant's interest is adequately represented by existing parties.5' Rule 24(a), Utah R. Civ. P.
While these standards must be carefully applied, the United States Supreme Court has shown
that it is appropriate to relax the standards in cases with substantial public interests at stake.
See, e.g., Cascade Natural Gas Corp. v. El Paso Natural Gas Co., 386 U.S. 129, 132-36
(1967) (allowing numerous intevenors in an antitrust action brought by the United States).
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Appellants satisfy the standards of Rule 24(a).
First, Appellants' application was timely. In Jenner v. Real Estate Servs., 659 P.2d
1072, 1073 (Utah 1983), this Court explained that the "timeliness*' of an application for
intervention must be determined based on the "facts and circumstances of each particular
case." Id. at 1074. The Special Fiduciary filed his Motion for Relief to Preserve Trust Assels
on May 5, 2009. (R. 15126-15128) Prior to that time, the trial court had imposed a stay of
litigation so that the parties and interested persons, including Appellants, could seek a
negotiated resolution on a number of issues, including the Special Fiduciary's previously
proposed sale of Berry Knoll and payment of the Fiduciary's fees and expenses and other Trust
obligations. Appellants were present and participated in good faith in those negotiations,
culminating in a settlement conference with Judge Paul Cassell on April 22-24, 2009. When
by his Motion the Special Fiduciary abruptly announced those discussions had failed and
sought to proceed with the sale of Berry Knoll without further hearing, Appellants immediately
filed their Motion to Intervene along with substantive motions seeking to block the sale. They
therefore acted timely in response to the Fiduciary's Motion and with respect to the specific
acts they challenged under the facts and circumstances of the litigation.
Second, Appellants claim "an interest relating to the property or transaction which is the
subject of the action." In Jenner, this Court held that the focus of the "claim of interest"
requirement is that the would-be intervenor claim an interest that "will be adversely affected by
the court's disposition of property." Jenner v. Real Estate Sei-vs., 659 P.2d at 1073. Following
Jenner, the Utah Court of Appeals further defined the "claim of interest" requirement as
follows: "The applicant's interest in the subject matter of the dispute must be a direct claim
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upon the subject matter of the action such that the applicant will either gain or lose by direct
operation of the judgment to be rendered, not a mere, consequential, remote or conjectural
possibility of being in some manner affected by the result of the original action." Interstate
Land Corp. v. Patterson, 797 P.2d 1101, 1108 (Utah Ct App. 1991) (citation and internal
quotation marks omitted); see also Commercial Block Realty Co. v. United States Fidelity &
Guar. Co., 83 Utah 414, 28 P.2d 1081, 1083 (1934) (for a party to intervene, "[h]e must have
an interest in the matter in litigation, in the success of either of the parties, or an interest against
both.").
The trial court did not apply these established tests. Instead, it applied without analysis
a circular "legal basis" test: "Any 'claim of interest' under Rule 24 must have a legal basis;
without it, no claimant has a right to a remedy and, therefore, no right to participate in the case
as a party." (R. 16381) The trial court also ruled that the claimed interest must be "legally
cognizable," and that the Attorneys General are "the only individuals with legally cognizable
interests." (R. 16381-16382) These rulings are the core of the trial court's error.
Of course, Appellants have a "legal basis" for their claim: that because of their
longstanding and close relationship with the Trust and its specific landholdings, and because of
the other parties' abject failure adequately to protect those interests, they satisfy the "special
interest" exception to the general rule that precludes taxpayers or members of the public
generally from suing to enforce a charitable trust. {See infra, Argument Section II) The trial
court's creation of a "legal basis" test, its invocation of the "legally cognizable interest"
standard, and its conclusion, without analysis, the Appellants lack such an interest simply begs

the question of whether the legal basis Appellants put forward is sufficient. Appellants
respectfully submit it is.
At stake here is the disposition of one of the most sacred pieces of property held by the
FLDS Church - Berry Knoll. Appellant Bishops have both direct temporal and sacred
responsibilities for their congregations. They rely on Berry Knoll to discharge those sacred
duties, including providing for the just physical and spiritual wants and needs of their
congregations. Similarly, Appellant Church Members have sacred responsibilities for parcels
of Berry Knoll and have, for years, dedicated their time, talents, resources, and labor to
improving Berry Knoll. They rely on Berry Knoll to discharge their sacred priesthood
stewardships to provide for the just wants and needs of their families and other FLDS Church
members. If the property is sold to a competing religious group with a competing truth-claim
as to its sacred status, there is no question that Appellants' interest will be adversely affected.
Similarly, Appellants have a unique interest in Berry Knoll and will gain or lose by
direct operation of any judgment regarding its sale. Specifically, the Bishops have the sacred
priesthood charge, pursuant to scripture and belief,6 to ensure that the just wants and needs of
their congregations are met. This charge includes providing for both the physical and spiritual
needs and wants of the people. According to the tenets of the FLDS faith, the Bishops' eternal
salvation is intimately connected with how well they discharge this duty, and they have relied

6

See D & C 51: 13: "And again, let the bishop appoint a storehouse unto his church; and
let all things both in money and in meat, which are more than is needful for the wants of
this people, be kept in the hands of the bishop/'
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in part on Berry Knoll to help them do so. Appellant Church Members have a similarly
compelling interest in the subject matter of this dispute. Each has worked to improve Berry
Knoll since it was purchased in the 1980s by Thomas and John Steed and later consecrated to
the Trust. Each has personally worked to turn over 500 acres of sagebrush into a working,
productive farm, removing the sagebrush, developing water, seeding, harvesting, fencing,
grazing cattle, irrigating, and producing food and income from Berry Knoll for their families
and the FLDS Church membership. They did so pursuant to a priesthood stewardship that each
was granted. It is a stewardship they consider sacred. The exercise of their religious beliefs
requires that they magnify that stewardship as part of their striving toward not only harmonious
communal living but also eternal salvation. Additionally, all Appellants regard Berry Knoll as
a sacred site of a future temple. The most sacred FLDS ordinances are conducted in temples,
and the land on which temples is situated is similarly sacred. Berry Knoll has provided, and,
so long as it is not sold, will continue to provide, for the just physical and spiritual wants and
needs of Appellants.
Appellants respectfully submit that by creating and imposing a "legally cognizable
interest" test rather than this Court's established "adverse effect" test, the trial court erred as a
matter of law, adopting a standard that is at once devoid of content, overly restrictive and
contrary to this Court's and the Court of Appeals' precedents. But as more fully set forth

7

Moore's Federal Practice, discussing the "variety of approaches" and "wide range of
terminology" used by various federal courts in discussing the "claim of interest"
requirement of Federal Rule 24(a), notes that the federal Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals
has referred to the need for a "legally cognizable interest," while the Sixth Circuit "has
ruled that a prospective intervenor need not claim a specific legal or equitable interest."
"M

below (see infra, Argument Section II), even if that were the test, Appellants have satisfied it
through the "special interest" exception to the general standing principles that the trial court
erroneously imposed as absolute bars.
The trial court's assertion that the Attorneys General are "the only individuals with
legally cognizable interests" is also erroneous. The Utah Code specifically provides: "The
settlor of a charitable trust, among others, may maintain a proceeding to enforce the trust."
Utah Code Ann. § 75-7-405(3) (emphasis added). The trial court's ruling ignores this statutory
language, and again simply begs the question: what "others," and under what circumstances?
The fact that a particular party has the statutory authority to initiate a lawsuit, and the movant
lacks such authority, is not dispositive. Thus the United States Supreme Court, interpreting
and applying the analogous Federal Rule, permitted a union member to intervene in a suit
brought by the Secretary of Labor to invalidate an election of union members where substantial
cause for doubt existed about the adequacy of the Secretary's representation of union
members' interests. Trbovich v. United Mine Workers, 404 U.S. 528, 537-539 and n.10
(1972). This case presents precisely the same justification for intervention by Appellants, and
Appellants meet the tests articulated by this Court and the Court of Appeals.
Third, Appellants are "so situated that the disposition of the action may as a practical
matter impair or impede [their] ability to protect that interest." Appellant Bishops' interest in

Moore's Federal Practice (3d ed.) § 24.03[2][a], at 24-29 - 24-30. Thus the Sixth Circuit
allowed minority students and student groups to intervene in an action challenging an
admissions policy that used race as a factor. Id. at 24-29 (citing Gruter v. Bollinger, 188
F.3d 394, 398-99 (6th Cir. 1999)).
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Berry Knoll is the interest of the vast majority of Trust participants. That is, the Bishops
represent the people for whom the Trust assets are meant to provide. As the Fiduciary has
repeatedly emphasized in the proceeding below, there is no party with standing who represents
these Trust participants, even under the terms of the Reformed Trust. That is not, however,
what the original settlors intended, or even what the trial court intended when it reformed the
Trust.
Moreover, in its Memorandum Decision, the trial court recognized that decisions
regarding the disposition of Trust assets should be informed, at least in part, by FLDS
priesthood leadership. Thus, "representatives of the FLDS Church (or of local priesthood
leadership) may provide non-binding input to the trustees concerning how the faith interprets
basic religious principles," and suggested that the temporary "advisory board" provide a
conduit. (R. 3469 ^ 37, R. 3477 ^f 58). Despite repeated petitions to the Fiduciary and the
anti-FLDS "advisory board," however, the FLDS voice has been ignored, and at times the
Fiduciary has acted in direct opposition to the Bishops' input. If Berry Knoll were to be sold
without hearing, or if a hearing were held participation by Appellants as parties, neither they
nor the FLDS people for whom the Trust was established will be able to protect their interest in
one of their most sacred assets.
Fourth, and finally, there is no existing party who adequately represents the Bishops'
interest in Berry Knoll, or more importantly, the voices of the thousands of faithful FLDS
Church members who look to them for stewardships. The Fiduciary represents a small
advisory board comprised mainly of disgruntled, ex-FLDS members whose only interest in
Berry Knoll is directly adverse to the FLDS people, and Appellants factual allegations show he

has followed the anti-FLDS position rather than considering the best interests of Trust
beneficiaries as a whole. The States' Attorneys General represent the public generally but
have no special interest in Berry Knoll, especially the kind of sacred stewardship of which the
Bishops maintain responsibility, and again have proven at best ineffectual and at worst openly
hostile to the FLDS perspective. Only Appellants truly represent the interest of the vast
majority of Trust participants. Unless this Court reverses the trial court's ruling, the FLDS
Church's voice will remain unheard, without any conduit for providing the "guidance"
required by the terms of the "reformed" Trust itself.

II.

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DENYING APPELLANTS' MOTIONS
TO INTERVENE FOR LACK OF "STANDING."
The trial court summarily denied Appellants' Motions for lack of standing. (R. 16381-

16382) The general proposition relied upon by the trial court is both straightforward and
inarguable: a party who has no interest in a charitable trust other than as a taxpayer and a
member of the general public to be benefited does not have the requisite interest to either
initiate or intervene in an action regarding the administration of a trust or the disposition of its
assets, In such circumstances, the Attorney General is given exclusive authority to enforce
charitable trusts. Restatement (Second) of Trusts § 391. As the Comment to the Restatement
observes, "[s]ince the community is interested in the enforcement of charitable trusts, a suit to
enforce a charitable trust can be maintained by the Attorney General of the State in which the
charitable trust is to be administered." Id.
It is similarly well settled that the mere fact that a person is a possible beneficiary is not
sufficient to entitle him to maintain a suit for the enforcement of a charitable trust.

-?4-

Restatement (Second) of Trusts § 391 comment. The estimable policy behind these general
principles is that in the absence of a limitation on standing to enforce charitable trusts, such
trusts could be subject to lawsuits by any disgruntled member of the public.
Contrary to the trial court's ruling, however, the general principles conferring
jurisdiction to enforce charitable trusts on the Attorney General, and denying standing to
members of the public generally, are not absolute. Utah law expressly provides: "The settlor
of a charitable trust, among others, may maintain a proceeding to enforce the trust." Utah
Code Ann. § 75-7-405(3) (emphasis added). The trial court's ruling would have the effect of
reading this language out of the statutes governing the enforcement of charitable trusts in Utah,
rather than giving it effect, by categorically precluding anyone besides the Attorney General
(and perhaps the settlor) from even participating in a proceeding involving a charitable trust.
The real question is not whether, but under what circumstances, "others" can be
involved in proceedings involving the charitable trust. The answer lies in the well-recognized
"special interest" exception to the Attorney General's enforcement powers. Under this
exception, anyone who is "entitled to benefits under the trust that are greater than or different
from those to which members of the public are entitled generally." 5 Scott and Ascher on
Trusts (5th ed.) § 37.3.10 at 2441. More broadly, "when a charitable trust is for the benefit of a
reasonably limited class of persons, any one or more of them ought to be able to sue on
behalf of themselves and the other members of the class to enforce the trust, at least insofar as
necessary to enjoin or redress a diversion of trust funds to another purpose." Id. at 2443
(emphasis added).

As opposed to the absolute bar on which the trial court's decision rests, a multi-factor
approach is used to determine whether a party has a special interest giving rise to standing to
enforce a charitable trust. The relevant factors include (1) extraordinary nature of acts
complained of and remedy sought; (2) presence of fraud or misconduct on part of charity or its
directors; (3) attorney general's availability or effectiveness; (4) nature of benefited class and
its relationship to charity; and (5) subjective, case-specific circumstances. Restatement
(Second) of Trusts § 391.
The trial court erred in failing even to consider this settled exception to the general
principles on which it rule. Each of the above factors, properly applied in this case, supports
Appellants' intervention.
First the acts complained of consist not of the ordinary, day-to-day administration of
the UEP Trust, but of extraordinary proposals to permanently dispose of unique Trust assets,
including the Berry Knoll Farm, not for the benefit of any Trust beneficiary but for the
payment the Special Fiduciary was not authorized to incur in the first place and has not been
authorized to pay. This is a "diversion of trust funds to another purpose" of the type that
specifically supports the Bishops' involvement, since they have a unique history and
perspective on Trust administration that is not shared by the Attorneys General or the Special
Fiduciary.
Second, the acts complained of include not only fraudulent conduct (specifically, fraud
on the court in connection with the default judgment obtained in collusion with those who sued
the Trust in the first place) but also criminal conduct (specifically, criminal trespass against
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FLDS Church members occupying Trust houses). Again, the diversion of trust funds for such
purposes is plainly improper and does nothing to address the wants and needs of the people.
Third, the Utah Attorney General has proven singularly ineffective in addressing, let
alone remedying, the ongoing mismanagement, and the Arizona Attorney General has not only
turned a blind eye but actively assisted. Thus millions of dollars in Trust funds continue to be
diverted for a self-described "war" on the Trust beneficiaries, but no one has done anything
about it. The Attorneys General initiated this suit claiming the exclusive authority to remedy
breaches of fiduciary duty and waste in connection with the assets of a charitable trust, and in
doing so achieved control over this religious trust. But now, having attained their political
objective, the Attorneys General watch from the sidelines as the Special Fiduciary decimates
the trust he is charged with protecting, and they insist on no accountability whatsoever.
Fourth, there is no question that the nature of the beneficiary class here is
distinguishable from the public at large and closely related to the purposes of the Trust, both as
originally constituted and as "reformed" by the trial court. The beneficiaries of the UEP Trust
as originally constituted were limited to those whom the FLDS Church, acting through its duly
ordained ecclesiastical representatives (including Appellant Bishops) and in the exercise of its
constitutionally-protected ecclesiastical authority, deemed worthy of participation. Even as
reformed, the beneficiaries are "limited to those individuals (1) who can demonstrate that they
previously made Contributions to either the Trust or the FLDS Church; or (2) subsequent to the
date of this Agreement make documented Contributions to the Trust which Contributions are
approved by the Board." (App. A, p.6, § 4.2) Thus the general policy behind not granting
standing to any taxpayer or member of the public generally simply is not implicated.
-?7-

Finally, the subjective, case-specific circumstances warrant Appellants' intervention.
Appellants seek to fill a void that has existed in this case since the Utah Attorney General first
intervened to protect the Trust from alleged waste. The void has been the lack of an active and
constructive voice on behalf of the vast majority of Trust beneficiaries and participants who
have been and remain active and faithful members of the FLDS Church.
Appellants Church members can provide that voice. Over 3,000 FLDS Church
members signed a declaration last year, under penalty of perjury, attesting to their opposition to
the Special Fiduciary's actions and their support for the positions taken by Appellants Willie
Jessop, Dan Johnson and Merlin Jessop in this action since they initially appeared back in
August 2008 in response to the Fiduciary's original proposal to sell Berry Knoll. A large
number of them subsequently traveled to St. George last November for the trial court's
scheduled hearing on the proposed sale. Because the trial court had never considered their
status as Intervenors with a specific, direct interest in the property at issue, however, those
individuals have not heretofore been able to articulate the voice of the people whose views
they represent.
Appellant Bishops can also provide that voice from their unique positions as Bishops
with responsibility for ministering to the "just wants and needs" of the faithful FLDS Church
members who reside in the areas where the UEP Trust lands are located. The Bishops had
specific responsibility for ensuring the proper use and disposition of Trust assets under the
original Trust, and they maintain that responsibility to the extent they can do so under the
Reformed Trust. Although required by the Reformed Trust, however, the Fiduciary has neither
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solicited nor considered their input, even when specifically offered (as was the case recently
with the delicate matter of use of the FLDS Church cemetery).
Case law addressing the "special interest" identifies two general requirements. First, the
persons invoking the exception must be among a "class of potential beneficiaries [that] is
sharply defined and limited in number." Public Benevolent Trust v. Humane Society of
Indianapolis, Inc., 829 N.E.2d 1039, 1047 (Indiana Ct. App. 2006). See also Hooker v. Edes
Home, 579 A.2d 608, 614 (D.C. Ct. App. 1990) ("a particular class of potential beneficiaries
has a special interest in enforcing a trust if the class is sharply defined and its members are
limited in number"); Alco Gravure Inc. v. Knapp Foundation, 64 N.Y.2d 458, 490 N.Y.S.2d
116, 479 N.E.2d 752, 755 (1985) (special interest exception applies to members of a "class of
potential beneficiaries [that] is sharply defined and limited in number"). Second, the nature of
the challenge the persons bring to the trustee's action must be of a "fundamental" nature rather
than a challenge to the trustee's normal exercise of discretion. See also Hooker, 579 A.2d at
615 (excluding standing for challenges to the "ordinary exercise of discretion on a matter
expressly committed to the trustees"); Alco Gravure, 479 N.E.2d at 765. Appellants satisfy
both of these requirements.
First, Appellants are among a class of beneficiaries that is sharply defined and limited in
number such that their interests are separate from those of the public at large. In Hooker v.
Edes Home, the trustees of a charitable trust sought to close a home for elderly widows, some
of whom sought to intervene in a pending probate matter to block the closure. In finding that
the widows had standing under the special interest exception, the court first determined that the
"class of potential beneficiaries is small and distinct enough that its members appear to have an
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interest distinguishable from the public's." 579 A.2d at 614. Despite the trustee's contention
that any woman could qualify as a possible beneficiary and thus defeat the "small and distinct"
requirement, the court noted that beneficiaries were limited by gender, income, age, marital
status, health, and residency. Based on these factors, the class of potential beneficiaries was
sufficiently limited to an identifiable group. See also Alco Gravure Inc. v. Knapp Foundation,
479 N.E.2d at 755 (finding the first requirement of the special interest exception met where the
persons were employees of a corporation that was entitled to a preference in the distribution of
a foundation's assets, the foundation was established to aid the employees and their families,
and the trustees of the foundation sought to dissolve the foundation and transfer its assets to a
tax-exempt foundation).
Similarly, Appellants are members of a class of potential beneficiaries that is defined
and limited in number such that its members have an interest distinguishable from the public's.
While the Trust beneficiaries include "those who consecrated their 'lives, time, talents, and
resources' in addition to those who consecrated real property" to the Trust (R. 3465, \ 29),
Appellants are among the even more limited number of potential beneficiaries who have
specifically dedicated their lives, time, talents and resources to the Trust. Thus they are a
distinct group whose interest in the Trust, and the specific property at issue, is distinguishable
from that of other potential Trust beneficiaries, and certainly from the general public the Utah
Attorney General represents, none of whom satisfy the consecration criteria.
The Hooker court recognized it is not the actual number of possible beneficiaries that
dictate the "small and distinct" character of the class; rather, it is the nature of the class's
limiting factors. Despite the fact that the class of beneficiaries in Hooker could grow to a large
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and even indefinite number, the limiting factors of gender, income, age, marital status, health,
and residency were sufficient to identify the class as "small and distinct." Here, the factors are
similarly limiting as they require voluntary relinquishment of personal ownership of every
type: beneficiaries, including Appellants, consecrate not only their lives, time, and talents, but
also their resources and real property to the Trust. They therefore satisfy the first requirement
for the special interest standing exception.
Second, Appellants challenge an act of the Fiduciary's that is fundamental and not
merely an act of ordinary discretion. In Hooker, the court "considered] the nature of the
challenge to the trustees' acts in deciding whether to apply the special interest exception" and
differentiated between challenges to recurring issues that fall within the "ordinary exercise of
discretion on a matter expressly committed to the trustees" and those issues that "will only be
litigated once." Id. at 615, 616. The court determined that the issue of closing the widows'
home was not an issue regarding "simple abuse of discretion by the Trustees," but that it would
be a "fundamental" change that, if successful, would eliminate any "present or potential
beneficiary [from] ever be[ing] able to reside in the Edes House." Id. at 616. See also Alco
Gravure, 479 N.E.2d at 765 (finding the special interest exception met where "the present
action concerns not the ongoing administration of a charitable corporation, but the dissolution
of that corporation and the complete elimination of the individual's plaintiffs' status as
preferred beneficiaries."); cf. Kania v. Chatham, 297 N.C. 290, 254 S.E.2d 528, 530 (1979)
(denying standing to a student to sue the trustees for not selecting student as scholarship

recipient by finding that the decision was one committed to the normal exercise of discretion of
o

the trustees.)
Similarly, Appellants seek to challenge actions on the part of the Fiduciary that are of
the most fundamental type: his diversions of Trust funds for improper purposes, including
conduct that has been adjudged to be criminal, as well as permanent disposition of one of their
most valuable, sacred landholdings—such actions that fundamentally and ineradicably change
the nature of the Trust. Selling Berry Knoll is precisely the type of fundamental act that, as in
Hooker, "will only be litigated once," and will eliminate any present or potential beneficiary
from ever being able to use the land to farm or produce income for the FLDS people or as the
site of a future FLDS temple and thus satisfies the second criterion for the special interest
standing exception. As the court explained in Hooker, a "fundamental" act of the trustee was
one that would eliminate any "present or potential beneficiary [from] ever be[ing] able to
reside in the Edes House." 579 A.2d at 616. That is, it would eliminate any use of the Trust's
most substantial asset. Even more egregious than the act of the trustee in Hooker, the
In Hooker, the court stated: "While the sale of trust property-including Edes House
itself-is undoubtedly a matter within the Trustees' discretion, the intent of the Board in
selling the House and the planned transfer of its functions to another entity raise
substantial questions about the compatibility of this action with the settlor's intent; and
these issues in turn distinguish the proposed action from an ordinary exercise of day-today discretion committed solely to the trustees' judgment. Moreover, the merger proposal
places more at stake than just the loss of an opportunity to live at a certain address in
Georgetown; it also portends the loss of Edes Home's independent identity, which may
adversely affect the interests of all beneficiaries as a class.... [WJhen, as here, the
Trustees decide upon a basic change affecting the interests of the entire class of intended
beneficiaries-and one alleged to be inconsistent with the settlor's will-the value of
denying representatives of the class access to judicial process to challenge that decision is
greatly diminished." 579 A.2d at 617-18.
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Fiduciary's proposal to sell the Berry Knoll farm to a competing religious sect would
permanently deprive Appellants and all FLDS faithful of physical and spiritual and sacred
benefits of the land. Its sale is not an act of "ordinary exercise of discretion."
In short, the effect of the trial court's ruling denying Appellants standing is to terminate
their legal right to challenge this act which serves only the Fiduciary's interest of obtaining
cash payment at the expense of the beneficiaries whose assets he is charged with protecting.
Appellants thus respectfully request this Court to recognize the "special interest" exception,
find that they satisfy the exception's criteria, reverse the trial court's ruling and grant them
standing to pursue the removal of the Fiduciary and his replacement by a Fiduciary with the
full trust and confidence of all Trust beneficiaries.
CONCLUSION
The trial court erred in denying Appellants' Motions to Intervene in the trial court
action. Appellants satisfy the requirements of Rule 24(a) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure,
and they have a "special interest" in the UEP Trust and specific assets currently at issue in the
trial court action. Appellants respectfully request that this Court reverse the trial court's denial
of Appellants' Motions to Intervene and remand this case to the trial court with the instruction
that Appellants be added and allowed to participate as parties.
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COIfRT^
^co U / v r
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH ^ ^ ^ ^ - ^ _ ^
SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT
^

IN THE MATTER OF THE UNITED EFFORT
PLAN TRUST
:

CORRECTED
RULING AND ORDER ON PENDING
MOTIONS
Case No. 053900848
Judge Denise Posse Lindberg
Date: July 17,2009

This matter is before the Court on a number of Motions that have been submitted for decision or are
otherwise ripe for determination. They are (1) Willie Jessop's, Dan Johnson's and Merlin Jessop's Motion
to Intervene; (2) Lyle Jeffs' and James Oler's Motion to Intervene; (3) Potential Intervenors' Motion to Stay
Proceedings, to Replace Special Fiduciary and to Enjoin Further Actions of Special Fiduciary Pending
Evidentiary Hearing; (4) Motion for Expedited Discovery; (5) Special Fiduciary's Motion for Relief to
Preserve Assets of the Trust; and (6) Arizona Attorney General's Motion for Partial Lift of Stay. Having
considered the Motions, the Court rules as follows:
Motions to Intervene and Proposed Intevenor's Other Motions
All the Motions to Intervene are DENIED. The Court has previously determined that individuals
who may be potential Trast beneficiaries have no standing to intervene in this action. The memoranda in
support of the Motions do not persuade the Court that the proposed Intervenors are uniquely situated or have
a particularized interest that satisfies the requirements of Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 24(a). Categorical
assertions of interest with respect to Trust property are insufficient to establish a right to intervene under
Rule 24(a). What proposed Intervenors must show-which they have not-is that they have a legally
cognizable interest in any Trust property. Any "claim of interest" under Rule 24 must have a legal basis;
without it, no claimant has a right to a remedy and, therefore, no right to participate in the case as a party.1

1

That said, since the inception of this case the Court has agreed to consider comments
from various non-parties, including interested potential beneficiaries, and has broadly noticed its
hearings to anyone who is interested. Upon request, the Court has also been willing to include
such individuals (or their counsel) in its distribution of Court decisions. Those actions by the
Court should not be understood as anything more than what they are-a courtesy to interested
individuals and as a way of ensuring that the Court receives relevant input on issues affecting the
Trust. The Court remains committed to receiving inputfromnon-parties in order for the Court to
be fully and fairly informed on the issues it must decide. However, the Court's courtesies should
not be misunderstood to imply that the Court recognizes those individuals as having standing in
the case.
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It is black letter law that potential beneficiaries of charitable trusts have no right to make claims upon
such trusts. Because the UEP Trust is a charitable trust, the only individuals with legally cognizable
interests are the Utah and Arizona Attorneys General (A.G.s) as representatives of the community, and
the Court-designated Special Fiduciary. The Court reaffirms its prior rulings on standing. The Court also
relies upon and incorporates by reference the analysis set forth in Section Il.a of the Arizona Attorney
General's Office's Memorandum in Opposition to Movants' Motion to Stay Proceedings, to Replace
Special Fiduciary, and to Enjoin Further Action of Special Fiduciary.2 Because the Motions to Intervene
must be denied for lack of standing, the proposed Intervenors' remaining motions are also DENIED.
Lifting of Stay/Sale of Berry Knoll property
The Special Fiduciary's Motion for Relief to Preserve Assets of the Trust, and the Arizona A. G. 's
Motion for Partial Lift of Stay are GRANTED. During the telephonic status conference held on May 27,
20095 the Court reiterated its position(also expressed during the January 20, 2009 telephonic status
conference) that the stay of the proposed sale of the Berry Knoll Farm was predicated upon the timely and
unconditional payment of the monthly fees charged for use or occupancy of UEP Trust property. As
detailed in the Court's written ruling of June 1,2009, during its off-the-record meeting with all counsel
on November 14, 2008, the Court was asked to stay the proposed sale of the property and grant the
various participants a period of time to explore settlement. To induce the Court to take that action, and
as a show of "good faith" by the FLDS community, the Court was promised that monthly payments of
approximately $64,000 would be made timely to the Utah A.G. Those payments would then be
forwarded to the Special Fiduciary and would be used to meet the Trust's financial obligations. However,
at the May 27th telephonic conference the Court was informed that the promised payments had not been
forthcoming. In light of that information the Court unequivocally ordered that the unpaid occupancy fees
be paid "forthwith." Although the payments were five months delinquent, the Court allowed the FLDS
to catch-up their payments, in full, through two equal installments payable on June 1 and June 15,2009.
A few days later, on June 1,2009, the Court issued a written ruling that restated its Order and clarified
that the payments were to be made unconditionally. Furthermore, the Court made it clear that if the terms
of its Order were not complied withfolly,the stay would be lifted and the Court would promptly proceed
to consider the proposal to sell the Berry Knoll Farm.
Notwithstanding the Court's Order, and its further requirement that the Utah A.G. immediately
forward the payments to the Special Fiduciary for his use in meeting Trust obligations, the payments
were made "under protest.5' That designation effectively rendered the funds unusable by the Special
Fiduciary. Further, the Utah A.G. agreed with FLDS representatives that he would not disburse the
second payment without FLDS approval. That side agreement is inconsistent with the Court's prior
Orders. The Court concludes that the promises and representations upon which the stay of the sale and
litigation were predicated have not been honored. As a result, badly-needed funds have not been available
2

The Special Fiduciary also filed an opposition, asserting that the Trust lacked sufficient
funds to defend against the Motion. The Special Fiduciary requested a hearing to resolve any
factual disputes underlying the motions. Because the Motions are resolved on the issue of
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to meet the Trust's pressing obligations. Therefore, within two business days of the issuance of this
Ruling and Order, the Utah A.G. is ordered to deposit with the Court all of the funds received to date
from/or on behalf of the FLDS. The Court will distribute the funds to the Trust to meet its obligations.
Additionally, the Court has no choice but to proceed promptly to set a hearing on the proposed
sale of the Berry Knoll Farm. The hearing will be held on Wednesday, July 29,2009,from9:00 a.m. to
noon, in courtroom W-46 at the Matheson Courthouse. Because of the limited seating available in the
courtroom, and in order to avoid potential disruption of other court hearings at the Matheson Courthouse
that day, a decorum order for that hearing will be forthcoming shortly.
Settlement proposals
The Court has received, and is in the process of reviewing, various settlement proposals that have
been filed. The Court is also reviewing the comments received by the June 30th deadline. Although the
Court's review is not yet complete, it is apparent that there remain widely divergent views on what the
appropriate course of action should be. Because of their roles as community representatives in this action,
the fact that the Utah and Arizona A.G.s have taken such divergent positions regarding the viability of
any settlement is of significant concern. The Court is studying all submissions and considering its
options; the Court will announce its decision(s) as promptly as possible.
ORDER
For the reasons stated in this Ruling and Order, the various pending Motions to Intervene and all
other motions brought by proposed Intervenors, are hereby DENIED.
A hearing on the sale of the Berry Knoll property will take place on Wednesday July 29,2009,
between 9:00 a.m. and noon, in W-46 of the Matheson Courthouse in Salt Lake City.
Withir^pyhaura of the issuance of this Ruling and Order, the Utah A.G. shall deposit with the
Court all funds received from/on behalf of the FLDS in connection with this action. The Court will
assume responsibility for disbursal of the funds to the Special Fiduciary in order to ensure that the Trust's
financial obligations are addressed.
SO ORDERED BY THE COURT this ff day of July, 2009.
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REFORMED
DECLARATION OF TRUST
OF THE
UNITED EFFORT PLAN TRUST

This Reformed Declaration of Trust of The United Effort Plan Trust is effective the 4S
day of October, 2006.
RECITALS
A.
The United Effort Plan Trust Agreement was originally executed effective
November 9, 1942, On the 3rd day of November, 1998, the Amended and Restated Declaration
of Trust of The United Effort Plan Trust was executed. The 1998 Restatement amended in total
and restated the 1942 Trust Agreement.
B.
The 1942 Trust Agreement and The 1998 Restatement were executed and the
Agreement is executed for the purpose of establishing an irrevocable trust qualified as a
charitable trust as the term is defined in the Utah Code and under applicable common law.
C.
Pursuant to a Memorandum Decision dated December 13,2005 entered by the
Honorable Denise Posse Lindberg, Judge of The Third Judicial District Court in and for Salt
Lake County, State of Utah, the 1998 Restatement was to be reformed. This Agreement is the
Reformed Declaration of Trust of The United Effort Plan Trust as directed by the Court.
D.
Assets were originally contributed to the Trust as described in the 1942 Trust
Declaration and the 1998 Restatement. Additional assets have been contributed to the Trust in
the Trust's name and the name of former trustees. All Trust Property, including subsequently
acquired assets, shall be held, managed, and distributed in accordance with the terms of this
Agreement.
E.
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This reformation of the Trust is guided by the following three principles:
E. 1

The Trust is a charitable trust; the beneficiaries of the Trust are large in
number and constitute a definite class, however the beneficiaries within
that class are indefinite and the Trust Property shall be devoted to
providing for the just wants and needs of the beneficiaries which purpose
is beneficial to the community.

E.2

The structure of the Trust shall not benefit, advocate or facilitate illegal
practices including, but not limited to, polygamy, bigamy, or sexual
activity between adults and minors.

E.3

The reformation and administration of the Trust shall be based on neutral
principles of law; the reformation shall not be based on religious doctrine
or practice and shall not attempt to resolve underlying controversies over
religious doctrine. The reformation shall allow for ecclesiastical input of
a non-binding nature and a mechanism - independent of priesthood input for establishing benefits under the Trust.
AGREEMENT

Therefore, pursuant to the Order of the Court, The Amended and Restated Declaration of
Trust of The United Effort Plan Trust is reformed in its entirety to read as follows:
ARTICLE \
DEFINITIONS
S ection 1.1 1942 Trust Agreement means The United Effort Plan Trust Agreement
originally executed effective November 9, 1942.
Section 1.2 The 1998 Restatement means The Amended and Restated Declaration of
Trust of The United Effort Plan Trust executed the 3rd day of November, 1998.
Section 1.3 Agreement means this Reformed Declaration of Trust of The United Effort
Plan Trust dated effective the
day of October, 2006.
Section 1.4

Annual Report shall have the meaning set forth in Section 5.6.1(b).

Section 1.5 Board means the Board of Trustees of the United Effort Plan Trust as
determined in Article 5. Except as otherwise set forth herein, whenever the Board is authorized
or required to take any action, such action shall require the affirmative vote of a majority of the
Trustees as set forth in Section 5.1.8.
Section 1.6

Conflicting Interest shall have the meaning set forth in Section 5.1.11(b).

Section 1.7

Contribution or Contributions shall have the meaning set forth in Section

3.2.
Section 1.8 Corporate Fiduciary means an institutional Fiduciary appointed pursuant
to this Agreement. Whenever a Corporate Fiduciary is appointed hereunder, the appointment
shall refer to the Coiporate Fiduciary as constituted at the time of the appointment and each
successor entity to the corporation however succession may occur. Succession as used herein
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shall include, but not be limited to, all forms of corporate reorganizations recognized by Section
368 of the IRC Code.
Section 1.9
Court means the Court having authority over Case No. 053900848 of The
Third Judicial District Court in and for Salt Lake County, Utah or its successors.
Section 1.10

Designated Recipients shall have the meaning set forth in Section 8.8.1.

Section 1.11

Disclosing Trustee shall have the meaning set forth in Section 5.1.11 (a).

Section 1.12
5.1.9(d).

Electronic Communication shall have the meaning set forth in Section

Section 1.13 Fiduciary means any person who has a fiduciary duty, as defined by statute
or common law or pursuant to this Agreement to the Trust, any trust created hereunder or to a
Trust Participant, including, but not limited to, Trustees.
Section 1.14
day Saints.

FLDS Church means the Fundamentalist Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-

Section 1.15 Individual Fiduciary means an individual appointed as a Fiduciary
pursuant to this Agreement. The appointment shall refer to the specified individual. Except as
specifically set forth herein otherwise, the office of an Individual Fiduciary may not voluntarily
or involuntarily be transferred by or to any other individual.
Section 1.16 IRC Code means the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 as amended, or
corresponding provisions of subsequent federal tax laws. When the Fiduciaries of the Trust are
directed to act in accordance with the IRC Code, they should give appropriate weight to the
Internal Revenue Service's regulations, revenue rulings and private letter rulings as well as court
decisions interpreting the IRC Code. However, this direction shall not be interpreted to preclude
the Fiduciaries from contesting the position of the Internal Revenue Service or any court as to the
proper interpretation of a IRC Code Section provided such contest is undertaken by the
Fiduciaries in good faith.
Section 1.17

Minutes shall have the meaning set forth in Section 5.1.10.

Section 1.18 Person, where appropriate, shall refer to either individuals or entities
(including, but not limited to, corporations, partnerships, estates and trusts) or both.
Section 1.19 Reformed Declaration of Trust means this Reformed Declaration of Trust
of The United Effort Plan Trust dated effective the
day of October, 2006.
-3458070

10

Section 1.20 Reports shall have the meaning set forth in Section 8.8.
Section 1.21 Required Disclosure shall have the meaning set forth in Section 5.1.11(c).
Section 1.22 Spendthrift Trustee or Spendthrift Trustees means those persons appointed
as trustees of the spendthrift trusts created pursuant to Section 6.8.
Section 1.23 Sub S Stock shall have the meaning set forth in Section 5.21.7.
Section 1.24 Trust means the trust created by the 1942 Trust Declaration as amended
and restated in the 1998 Restatement and as reformed by this Agreement.
Section 1.25 Trust Participants shall have the meaning set forth in Section 4.2.
Section 126 Trust Property shall refer to all types of assets which may be owned from
time to time by the Trustees on behalf of the Trust, including but not limited to tangible and
intangible assets and real and personal property.
Section 1.27 Trustee or Trustees means those persons appointed as Trustees of this
Trust.
Section 1.28 Utah Code. Utah Code as used herein shall mean the Utah Code of 1953,
as amended.
ARTICLE 2
CONTINUATION OF TRUST
Section 2.1 Trust Name. The Trust shall continue to be known as The United Effort
Plan Trust, and shall operate under such other name(s) as the Board mayfromtime to time
designate.
Section 2.2 Trust Term. This Trust shall continue in perpetuity or for the longest time
period allowable pursuant to statutory or common law unless the Board determines that the
purposes for the Trust have been fulfilled or the Trust cannot feasibly operate under its stated
purposes, at which time the Board shall terminate the Trust and distribute all of the Trust
Property consistent with the purposes of the Trust as set forth in Article 4. To the extent the rule
of perpetuities applies, neither this Trust, any trust created by this Trust nor any trust created
pursuant to the exercise of a special power of appointment granted pursuant to this Trust, shall
continue beyond the period set forth by the Rule against Perpetuities as applied under the laws of
the state having jurisdiction of the trust in question. Upon the expiration of the Rule against
Perpetuities period, the Board, the trustees of any trust created by this Trast and the trustees of
-44580/0
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any trust created pursuant to the exercise of a special power of appointment granted pursuant to
this Trust shall terminate the trust and shall distribute the Trust Property consistent with the
purposes of the Trust as set forth in Article 4. If the permissible distributees' relative interests are
uncertain, the Board shall distribute the Trust Property to the permissible distributees as the
Board deems to be consistent with the intent of this Trust Agreement as stated herein. In the
event the Board is uncertain as to the intent, the Board may seek instructions from a court having
jurisdiction over the administration of the trust.
Section 2.3
Irrevocable. Except as otherwise provided herein, this Reformed Trust
Agreement is irrevocable and neither the Board, any Trust Participant nor any other person shall
have the power to amend the Reformed Trust Agreement, except upon further order of a court
having jurisdiction over the administration of the trust as set forth in Section 8.3.
Section 2.4 Distinct Organization. The Trust is separate and distinct from the United
Effort Plan, a religious effort, the FLDS Church, as well as any other religious efforts, objectives,
doctrines or organizations.
ARTICLE 3
TRANSFERS IN TRUST
Section 3.1
General Provisions. The assets currently held by the Trust and any assets
which subsequently may be transferred to or received by the Trustees shall be held by the
Trustees in trust and shall be administered upon the terms and conditions and for the purposes
herein set forth.
Section 3.2
Contributions. For purposes of this Trust, contributions to the Trust may
be in the form of real and personal property of any nature and may also include consecrations of
time, talents, money and materials and improvements to Trust Property (individually a
"Contribution" and collectively the "Contributions").
Section 3.3
Acceptance of Transfers and Contributions. All transfers and
Contributions to the Trust shall be accepted only if they are without reservation or claim of right
and/or ownership by the contributor. Additionally, any and all improvements made on or to
Trust Property shall become the sole property of the Trust without reservation of right or
ownership. The Board shall have the right to accept or reject any Contributions to the Trust.
ARTICLE 4
PURPOSES AND PARTICIPANTS
Section 4.1
Purposes. The Trust shall be administered and treated as a charitable trust
as the term is defined in the Utah Code and applicable common law. Trust Property shall be
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held, used and distributed to provide for Trust Participants, as defined below, according to their
wants and their needs, insofar as their wants are just. Just wants and needs concern primarily
housing, with the goal of securing residences for Trust Participants. Secondarily, just wants and
needs concern education, including scholarships, occupational training and economic
development. Just wants and needs may also include food, clothing, medical needs and other
items within the discretion of the Board. Trust Property may also be held, used and distributed
for community development, including, but not limited to, community buildings and places,
schools, parks and cemeteries, etc.
Section 4.2 Trust Participants. Individuals who may be privileged to receive benefits
from the Trust ("Trust Participants") shall be limited to those individuals (1) who can
demonstrate that they had previously made Contributions to either the Trust or the FLDS Church;
or (2) who subsequent to date of this Agreement make documented Contributions to the Trust
which Contributions are approved by the Board. Trust Participant status shall not be based upon
the value of the property or services contributed and shall be interpreted liberally consistent with
the charitable purpose of the Trust.
Section 4.3 Use of Trust Property. The Board in its discretion shall distribute all, part
or none of the net annual income of the Trust to fulfill the purposes of this Trust. The Board may
also invade the principal of the Trust to fulfill the purposes of the Trust
Section 4.4 Discretion in Fulfillment of Purposes. The Board shall have full discretion
to fulfill the purposes of this Trust as the Board deems appropriate.
ARTICLE 5
BOARD OF TRUSTEES
Section 5.1

Board.

5.1.1 Composition. The Board shall consist of an odd number of Trustees no
fewer than five and no more than nine Trustees. Trustees should have a demonstrated ability to
act independently and in the best interest of the Trust and be committed to the general principles
set forth in the Recitals and the Purposes as set forth in Article 4.
5.1.2 Appointment. The Initial Board shall be appointed by the Court at such
time as the Court determines is appropriate. Until the Board receives complete authority for the
administration of the Trust, the Court shall retain oversight over the Trust and shall determine
how and by whom the Trust Property shall be administered and the compensation of those
persons administering the Trust. The Court may transfer duties and authority to the Board in
stages. The Court may assign to the Board some, all, or none of the duties of Trust
administration at such times as the Court determines the Board can effectively administer such
-6458070 10

assigned duties. Unless otherwise ordered by the Court, duties and authority previously granted
to the Special Fiduciary by the Court shall be retained by the Special Fiduciary until the Court
transfers such duties and authority to the Board.
5.1.3 Additional or Replacement Trustees. Once the initial Board is appointed,
additional or replacement Trustees, shall be appointed by the Board. If a Trustee fails or ceases
to serve or is removed as a Trustee, a replacement Trustee shall be appointed by the Board within
90 days of such vacancy. All persons who consent to serve as additional or replacement
Trustees, shall accept in writing the office of Trustee and the fiduciary duties imposed on
Trustees of the Trust.
5.1.4 Failure to Replace Trustee. In the event that a replacement Trustee is not
appointed by the Board within 90 days of a vacancy, a Trustee or Trust Participant may petition a
court of proper jurisdiction to name a replacement Trustee.
5.1.5 Term. With the exception of the Initial Board, Trustees shall serve for sixyear terms. The initial Trustees shall be divided into three groups as determined the Court. The
tenn for the Initial Trustees comprising the first group shall expire after two years, of the second
group after four years and of the third group after six years, so that approximately one third of the
Trustees shall be appointed every second year. Additional Trustees shall be included in the
group containing the fewest members. A replacement Trustee shall serve for the remaining term
of the replaced Trustee. Trustees may serve multiple, but not consecutive terms, except as
otherwise ordered by the Court.
5.1.6 Removal A Trustee may be removed upon a showing of good cause,
upon the affirmative vote of at least 2/3rds of the Trustees. Good cause shall be the failure of
the Trustee to fulfill his or her obligations under the Agreement or violation of other fiduciary
obligations imposed by the Agreement or by law. Removal of a Trustee shall be by written
notice delivered to the removed Trustee, effective at the date and time set forth in the Notice.
5.1.7 Compensation. The Trustees will initially be compensated on a per
meeting basis, regardless of the length of the meetings at the rate of One Hundred Seventy-Five
Dollars ($175.00) per meeting. Compensation of the Trustees may only be changed by the
unanimous vote of the Trustees. Compensation shall in no event exceed that which would
ordinarily be paid for like services by charitable enterprises under like circumstances. Travel
expenses for Trustees will be reimbursed at the same rate paid to Utah State employees for instate business travel. Whenever possible, the Board will minimize the costs of travel by using
available technology, by selecting meeting sites that will most effectively control travel costs, or
by any other appropriate means.
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5.1.8

5.1.9

Meetings, Quorums and Voting.
(a)

The Board shall meet at least quarterly, but shall meet as often as
necessary to effectively administer the Trust. The scheduling and
agenda of the meetings shall be set by the President.

(b)

A majority of the Trustees shall constitute a quorum for the
transaction of business at any meeting of the Board. If less than a
quorum is present at a meeting, the Trustees present may adjourn
the meeting from time to time without further notice.

(c)

Except as specifically set forth otherwise, the act of a majority of
the Trustees shall be the act of the Board.

(d)

The Board may permit any Trustee to participate in a regular or
special meeting by, or conduct the meeting through the use of, any
means of communication by which all Trustees participating may
hear each other during the meeting. Any Trustee participating in a
meeting by such means is considered to be present in person at the
meeting.

(e)

No Trustee may vote by proxy.

(f)

Written notice stating the place, day, and hour of both regular and
special meetings, and in the case of a special meeting, the purpose
or purposes for which the meeting is called, which shall be
delivered not less than five (5) nor more than thirty (30) days
before the date of the meeting in accordance with the provisions of
Section 5.1.12, to each Trustee.

Action Without a Meeting.
(a)

Any action required or permitted to be taken at a Board meeting
may be taken without a meeting if each and every Trustee in
writing either:
(i)
(ii)

votes for the action; or
votes against the action or abstains from voting and waives
the right to demand that action not be taken without a
meeting.
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(b)

Action is taken under this Section only if the affirmative vote for
the action equals or exceeds the minimum number of votes that
would be necessary to take the action at a meeting at which all of
the Trustees then in office were present and voted.

(c)

An action taken pursuant to this Section may not be effective
unless the President receives writings describing the action taken
or otherwise satisfying the requirements of Subsection (a) signed
by all Trustees which writings are not revoked pursuant to
Subsection (g).

(d)

The writing described above may be received by electronically
transmitted facsimile or other form of wire or wireless
communication ("Electronic Communication") providing the
President with a complete copy of the document, including a copy
of the signature on the document. Within a reasonable time after
execution, the Trustee providing the Electronic Communication
shall deliver to the President an originally executed writing. For
purposes of Subsections (f) and (g), the writing shall be deemed
received by the President when the Electronic Communication is
received.

(e)

A Trustee's right to demand that action not be taken without a
meeting shall be considered to have been waived if the President
receives a writing satisfying the above requirements that has been
signed by the Trustee and not revoked pursuant to Subsection (g).

(f)

Action taken pursuant to this Section shall be effective when the
last writing necessary to effect the action is received by the
President, unless the writings describing the action taken set forth a
different effective date.

(g)

Any Trustee who has signed a writing pursuant to this Section may
revoke the writing by a writing signed and dated by the Trustee,
describing the action and stating that the Trustee's prior vote with
respect to the writing is revoked if the revocation is received by the
President before the last writing necessary to effect the action is
received by the President.
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(h)

Action taken pursuant to this Section has the same effect as action
taken at a meeting of the Board and may be described as an action
taken at a meeting of the Board in any document.

5.1.10 Minutes of Board Meetings and Resolutions on Actions Without
Meetings. Except as otherwise set forth in this Section 5.1.10, Minutes of the Meetings of the
Board and copies of Resolutions of the Board taken Without a Meeting (collectively the
"Minutes") shall be made available as set forth in Section 8.8 within ten (10) days after approval
of the Minutes. Information contained in the Minutes which is determined by the unanimous
vote of the Trustees to be sensitive need not be made available, however, a notation shall be
made in the minutes that sensitive information has been omitted.
5.1.11 Conflicts of Interest
(a)

Any Trustee who has a potential Conflicting Interest in any
decision being considered by the Board (the "Disclosing Trustee")
shall disclose such conflict by making a Required Disclosure prior
to any action by the Board.

(b)

A "Conflicting interest" with respect to the Trust means the interest
the Disclosing Trustee has respecting a transaction effected or
proposed to be effected by the Trust if the Disclosing Trustee
knows that the Disclosing Trustee or a member of the Disclosing
Trustee's family is either a party to the transaction or has a
beneficial financial interest in, or is so closely linked to, the
transaction and the transaction is so financially significant to the
Disclosing Trustee or a member of the Disclosing Trustee's family
that the interest would reasonably be expected to exert an influence
on the Disclosing Trustee's judgment.

(c)

"Required disclosure" means disclosure by the Disclosing Trustee
of the existence and nature of the Conflicting Interest; and all facts
known to the Disclosing Trustee respecting the subject matter of
the transaction that an ordinarily prudent person would reasonably
believe to be material to a judgment about whether or not to
proceed with the transaction.

(d)

The Board, in its discretion, shall have the right to require the
Disclosing Trustee to recuse himself or herself from voting on that
transaction.
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5.1.12 Notice.
(a)

All notices provided for by this Agreement shall be made in
writing (1) either by actual delivery of the notice into the hands of
the parties thereunto entitled, (2) by facsimile transmission, (3) by
electronic delivery with confirmed receipt, or (4) by the mailing of
the notice in the U.S. mails to the address appearing on xhe books
of the Trust or given by the person entitled to notice to the Trust
for the purpose of notice, certified mail, return receipt requested
(postage prepaid). If no address for a person entitled to notice
appears on the Trust's books or is given by such person, notice
shall be deemed to have been given if sent by mail to the last
address for such person, known to the Trust.

(b)

Notice shall be deemed to be received in case (1) on the date of its
actual receipt by the party entitled thereto, in case (2) and (3) the
notice shall be considered delivered upon completion of the
transmission by the sender and the receipt by the sender of an
affirmative indication that the message has been successfully
transmitted, and in case (4) three (3) days after the date when
deposited in the United States mail.

(c)

If any notice addressed to a person at the address of such person
appearing on the books and records of the Trust is returned to the
Trust by the United States Postal Service marked to indicate that
the United States Postal Service cannot deliver the notice to the
person at such address, all future notices or reports shall be deemed
to have been duly given without further mailing if the same shall
be available to the person upon written demand of the person at the
principal executive office of the Trust for a period of one (1) year
from the date of the giving of such notice.

(d)

A certificate or an affidavit of the mailing, transmission or other
means of giving any notice of any meeting shall be executed by the
President and shall be filed and maintained in the minute book of
the Trust.

5.1.13 Waiver of Notice. If notice is required to be given to a Trustee, a waiver
in writing signed by the person or persons entitled to the notice, whether made before or after the
time for notice to be given, is equivalent to the giving of notice.
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Section 5.2

General Powers and Duties.

5 2.1 Except as otherwise set forth herein, the Board shall have all power
necessary to fulfill its responsibilities under this Trust Agreement and specifically those powers
set forth in Utah Code Sections 75-7-813 and 814, as it now exists and as it may be amended in
the future. The Board shall have: (1) the power to hire employees and/or independent contractors
to handle the administrative duties of the Trustees, (2) the power to adopt bylaws to govern the
administration of the affairs of the Trustees, (3) the power to delegate its responsibilities to
individual Trustees or committees, and (4) the power to act by written approval of the Board
without the necessity of a formal meeting, (5) to invest Trust Property in all types of investments
permissible by law for investment of Trust Property including, but not limited to, limited
partnerships, limited liability companies, etc., (6) the power to manage the Trust Property, and
(7) the power to employ attorneys, accountants, brokers and other agents at the expense of the
Trust and such expenses shall not be deducted from any Trustee's reasonable fee for services
herein.
5.2.2 In addition to all of the powers granted to the Trustees pursuant to this
Trust Agreement and by law, the Board shall have the power to establish separate organizations,
including profit and non-profit entities, if necessary, to carry forth the necessary administration
and purposes of the Trust.
5.2.3 It shall be the duty and responsibility of the Board to determine how best
to fulfill the purposes of the Trust and specifically how to invest, administer and distribute the
Trust Property.
5.2.4 To the extent that the Trust's Purpose conflicts with provisions of the Utah
Uniform Prudent Investor Act, Utah Code Title 75, Chapter 7, Part 9, the Board shall be relieved
of any obligation under that Act.
Section 5.3
Specific Powers and Duties. Without limiting the authority conferred by
Utah Code Sections 75-7-813, the Board may:
5.3.1

determine Trust Participants;

5.3.2

determine the benefits available, if any, to Trust Participants;

5.3.3 deteimine the terms and conditions governing occupancy and use of Trust
Property and, where appropriate, enter into occupancy agreements with individual Trust
Participants;
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5.3.4 manage all other aspects of Trust Property, including collecting taxes,
resolving occupancy claims and disputes;
5.3.5 distribute or sell Trust Property to settle legal or equitable claims brought
against the Trust or for any other legitimate Trust purpose;
Section 5.4
Investments. The Board may purchase, acquire or retain any kind of
investment asset which a trustee may hold under the law of the jurisdiction in which the Trust is
being administered. The Board's actions in managing the Trust Property shall be measured by
the overall performance of the Trust Property, and not by the performance or lack of performance
of individual assets.
Section 5.5
Types of Transactions. The Board may sell, exchange, lease, pledge,
mortgage, transfer, convert, or otherwise dispose of or grant options with respect to any Trust
Property. The Board may enter into leases and contracts even though the term of the lease or
contract may extend beyond the period fixed by statute for leases or contracts made by fiduciaries
or beyond the duration of any trust hereunder.
Section 5.6

Duty to inform and report.

5.6.1 Notwithstanding the provisions of Utah Code Section 75-7-811, the Board
shall only be required to make the following reports:
(a)

Such reports as are requested by the Court or as reasonably
required by any court having jurisdiction over the administration of
the trust;

(b)

At least annually and at the termination of the Trust a report of the
Trust Property, liabilities, receipts, and disbursements, including
the amount of the Trustees' compensation or a fee schedule or other
writing showing how the Trustees' compensation was determined,
a listing of the Trust Property and, if feasible, their respective
market values (the "Annual Report")-

5.6.2 The Annual Report shall be made available as set forth in Section 8.8
within 90 days of the end of each fiscal year of the Trust.
Section 5.7
Borrowing. The Board may borrow money from any source for the benefit
of the Trust, and as security for any such loan, may mortgage or pledge any Trust Property. A
Trustee may loan money to the Trust with the approval of the Board provided the terms of the
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loan are no more beneficial to the Trustee than those terms that would be charged by a
commercial lender in the community in which the Trust is being administered.
Section 5.8
Management The Board may vote any shares of stock or other securities,
membership or partnership interests, etc. held by the Trustees on behalf of the Trust, in person or
by general or limited proxy. The Board may execute, rescind, terminate or amend any voting '
trust agreement. If the Trust becomes a party to a voting trust agreement, the Board may deposit
securities or other property with a trustee or accept securities as a trustee (whether or not the
voting trust agreement extends beyond the duration of the trust). The Board may consent,
directly or through a committee or agent, to any recapitalization, reorganization, consolidation,
merger, dissolution or liquidation of any corporation, partnership, limited liability company or
association in which the Trust has an interest. The Board may make any payments, assignments,
or subscriptions and take any other steps which the Board may deem necessary or proper to
enable the Trust to obtain the benefits of any of these transactions.
Section 5.9
Insurance. The Board may purchase and retain life, fire, rent, title, liability
or casualty insurance or any other insurance as the Board deems advisable under the
circumstances.
Section 5.10 Principal and Income. The Board shall have discretion to determine what
is principal orincome and to apportion and'to allocate its receipts, taxes and other expenses and
charges between the two. Except as otherwise determined by the Board, the Board shall allocate
receipts and disbursements between principal and income in accordance with the Utah Revised
Uniform Principal and Income Act (Utah Code Section 22-3-101 et aL). The Board does not
need to maintain a separate income account. The Board may accumulate income notwithstanding
the provisions of Sections 665 through 667 of the IRC Code. The Board may treat accumulated
income as principal.
Section 5.11 Tax Elections. The Board shall have the power to make tax elections as
the Board deems advisable for the benefit of the Trust and the Trust Participants.
Section 5.12 Settlement of Claims. The Board shall have the power to commence or
defend, at the expense of the Trust, such litigation with respect to the Trust or any Trust Property
as the Board considers advisable. The Board shall have power to renew, assign, alter, extend,
compromise, release, with or without consideration, or submit to arbitration, obligations or
claims held by or asserted against the Trust.
Section 5.13 Reserves for Amortization, Obsolescence, Depreciation and Depletion.
The Board may charge to operating expense all current costs of amortization, obsolescence,
depreciation and depletion of any Trust Property and may provide adequate reserves for
amortization, obsolescence, depreciation and depletion.
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Section 5.14 Agents. The Trust may hold investments in the name of a nominee or a
substitute trustee and may employ brokers, agents, attorneys and custodians for any Trust
Property.
Section 5.15 Reimbursement of Advances. The Board may reimburse a Trustee out of
the Tmst for all advances made for the benefit or protection of the Trust or the Trust Property and
for all expenses, losses and liabilities incurred in connection with the administration of the Trust
not resulting from a breach of trust committed in bad faith or with reckless indifference to the
purposes of the trust or the interests of the beneficiaries.
Section 5.16 Distributions in Kind. The Board may make any distributions or payments
in kind, or cause any shares to be composed of cash, property or undivided fractional interests in
property different in kind from any other share. The Board shall determine the value of any
distributions in kind. The Board may acquire assets for distribution in kind to the Trust
Participants.
Section 5.17 Trust Expenses. The Board may pay from either income or principal of
the Trust the expenses of administering the Trust; however, the Board shall allocate Trust
expenses between income and principal in accordance with Section 5.10 above,
Section 5.18

Payments to Minors or Legally Disabled Trust Participants,

5.18.1 In the event the Board desires to make distribution to a Trust Participant
who is under the age of twenty one (21) years, the Board may distribute the distribution to a
custodian for that Trust Participant under a Uniform Gifts or Transfers to Minors Act.
5.18.2 In the event the Board desires to make distribution to a Trust Participant
who is under a legal disability other than minority, the Board may make distribution by one or
more of the following methods: (a) by making distribution to the Trust Participant's legal
Guardian or Conservator; (b) by making distribution on behalf of the Trust Participant to any one
with whom the Trust Participant resides; (c) by making distribution to third parties in discharge
of the Trust Participant's bills or debts, including bills for premiums on insurance policies; or
(d) by making distribution to the Trust Participant directly.
Section 5.19 Consolidation, The Board may consolidate the Trust Property or of any
trust hereunder with any other tmst provided proper records are kept of the Trust Property
allocable to each tmst and there will be no unfavorable tax consequences as a result of
consolidation. In this regard, the Board is instructed to carefully review the possibility of
unfavorable generation skipping tax consequences as a result of a consolidation of separate
trusts. If the Board consolidates separate trusts, the Board shall not be required to physically
divide any of the investments or any other property unless necessary or deemed advisable for the
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purpose of distribution. Instead, the Board may keep any part of the consolidated trusts in one or
more funds in which the separate and distinct trusts shall have undivided interests.
Section 5.20 Acting in Other Jurisdictions. If for any reason the Board is required or
deems it advisable to take any action in any jurisdiction in which it is illegal or inadvisable for
the Board to act in that jurisdiction, the Board may appoint another person or corporation to act
in the other jurisdiction as the Board deems advisable. The person appointed shall be required to
accept the office of Trustee and the fiduciary duties imposed on Trustees of the Trust.
Section 5.21 Miscellaneous Trustee Provisions. The Board shall have the following
powers:
5.2LI Lending Money. To lend money to any person subject to such security and
interest requirements as determined by the Board.
5.21.2 Withholding Distributions. To withhold Trust Property from distribution
without payment of interest, if at the time for distribution of the Trust Property the Board
determines that the Trust Property maybe subject to conflicting claims, to tax deficiencies, or to
liabilities, contingent or otherwise, which properly must be resolved before distribution can be
made.
5.21.3 Purchase Bonds at Premium. To purchase bonds and to pay premiums in
connection with the purchase as the Board, in its discretion, considers advisable; provided,
however, that the Board shall treat part of the interest payments on the bond, or sales proceeds if
necessary, as the repayment of principal as is reasonable under the circumstances.
5.21.4 Purchase Bonds at Discount. To purchase bonds at a discount from face
value as the Board, in its discretion, considers advisable; provided, however, that the Board shall
treat part of the return of principal as income as is reasonable under the circumstances.
5.2L5 Proration. Upon the termination of any trust, the Board shall distribute
undistributed, accrued income to the Trust or the Trust Participants as determined by the Board.
5.21.6 Partnership or Limited Liability Company. In addition to any other rights
granted to the Board, the Board shall have the right to authorize the Trust to enter into general or
limited partnership agreements, to execute Certificates of General or Limited Partnership and/or
to serve as a General and/or Limited Partner. The Board shall also have therightto authorize the
Trust to enter into limited liability company agreements, to execute the Articles of Organization
thereof and to serve as a member and/or manager of such companies.
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5.21.7 S Corporation Stock. If this Trust holds stock in an S Corporation, as that
term is defined by IRC Code Section 1361 (hereinafter "Sub S Stock"), the Board, in the Board's
sole discretion, may reform the Trust, or any sub-trust into which the Sub S Stock is or may be
transferred, establish separate trusts or divide existing trusts so that such trust, as reformed, is
qualified as a Subchapter S corporation shareholder Trust under IRC Code Section 1361.
Section 5.22

Delegation.

5.22.1 The Board may delegate investment and management functions that a
prudent trustee of comparable skills could properly delegate under the circumstances. The Board
may not delegate the Board's discretionary authority to determine the amount, timing and
recipient of distributions from the Trust. The Board shall exercise reasonable care, skill, and
caution in:
(a)

selecting the agent;

(b)

establishing the scope and terms of the delegation consistent with
the purposes of the trust; and

(c)

periodically reviewing the agent's actions to monitor the agent's
performance and compliance with the terms of the delegation.

5.22.2 In performing a delegated function, an agent has a duty to the Trust to
exercise reasonable care to comply with the terms of the delegation.
5.22.3 A Trustee who complies with the requirements of this Subsection 5.22 is
not liable to the Trust, any trust created hereunder, .the Trust Participants or other beneficiaries of
the Trust or any trust created hereunder for the decisions or actions of the agent to whom the
function was delegated.
Section 5.23 President and Other Officers. The Board shall annually elect one of the
Trustees as President of the Board. The Board may also elect such other officers or establish such
committees as the Board deems necessary, shall designate the duties of such officers and
committees and shall establish a chain of command as appropriate. Other than the President,
officers shall not be required to be Trustees. The President shall execute any necessary
documents on behalf of the Trust, including contracts, deeds, transfers, assignments and other
documents to manage and carry out the purposes of the Trust, unless the Board designates others
to execute such documents. The President shall also be responsible for scheduling and setting the
agenda for Board meetings as requested by individual Trustees and as necessary to address
effectively the needs of the Trust. All officers and committee members shall serve at the
pleasure of the Board and may be removed at anytime by the Board.
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ARTICLE 6
DISTRIBUTIONS, SPENDTHRIFT TRUSTS AND USE OF TRUST PROPERTY
Section 6.1 Distributions. The Board may from time to time distribute Trust Property
as they deem advisable to individual Trust Participants, or all of them, in accordance with the
Trust's overall purpose as set forth herein. Such distributions may be made to or for the benefit of
the Trust Participants by any means deemed appropriate by the Board, including transfers by
deed or in trust or by other appropriate instrument or means. It is specifically contemplated that
property conveyances to Trust Participants through the means of spendthrift trusts maybe a
necessary and appropriate method to accomplish the ultimate goal of securing residences for
Trust Participants.
Section 6.2
Right to Trust Property, No Trust Participant shall have a right to Trust
Property. No single factor defining just wants and needs shall obligate the Board to use or
distribute Trust Property to or for the benefit of any Trust Participant. The determination of the
just wants and needs of a Trust Participant shall be made in the sole and absolute discretion of
the Board.
Section 6.3
Mechanism for Trust Participants to Petition for Benefits. Any Trust
Participant may make a request for benefits from the Trust by filing with the Board (or its
authorized representative), a written petition setting forth the benefits desired and the facts and
circumstances supporting such petition. Neither the filing of a petition nor the failure of the
Board to respond to a petition shall entitled a Trust Participant to any benefit from the Trust.
The Board may respond to the petition at such time, if ever, and in such manner as the Board in
its sole discretion determines.
Section 6.4
Factors to Consider. Consistent with their fiduciary duties under the Utah
Trust Code and the common law, the Board should use their life experiences, good judgment and
common sense in administering the Trust Property and may consider some or all of the following
factors in administering the Trust:
6.4.1 the financial condition and needs of the Trust Participant including
existing or potential sources of income, compensation or other recovery;
6.4.2 the previous or present use of Trust Property by the Trust Participant,
including the length of time the Trust Participant has used and relied on Trust Property;
6.43 the Trust Participant's cooperation with the Board, acceptance of
occupancy agreements, operation of businesses on Trust Property consistent with the Trust's
purposes and compliance with the rules and standards set by the Board;
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6.4.4 the contribution of services or assets to the Trust, including improvements
to Trust Property by the Trust Participant;
6.4.5 the efforts of the Trust Participant to protect Trust Property through
donations for the payment of property taxes, land surveys, insurance premiums and other
expenses related to the Trust;
6.4.6 the Trust Participant's efforts to keep Trust Property safe, in good repair
and otherwise properly maintained;
6.4.7

the Trust Participant's ability or inability to cooperate openly with the

6.4.8

any legitimate grievance a Trust Participant may have against the Trust;

Board;

and
6.4.9 recommendations received from an authorized representative of the FLDS
Church concerning what a particular Trust Participant's just wants and needs may be in light of
the religious principles of the FLDS Church. These recommendations shall be non-binding and
shall be only one criterion to be considered and shall not be the controlling criterion. No
recommendation may be considered, however, if it benefits, advocates or facilitates illegal
practices. If the FLDS Church wishes to provide recommendations with respect to the just wants
and needs of Trust Participants, it shall designate an authorized representative and shall
communicate such designation to the Board in writing. The authorized representative may
provide input to the Board in writing and/or may be given the opportunity to provide input at the
meetings of the Board.
Section 6.5
Prohibited Consideration Factors. In administering the Trust, the Board
shall not consider whether any Trust Participant participates in polygamy. In so doing, the Board
will not be deemed to be benefitting, advocating or facilitating illegal practices.
Section 6.6

Occupancy and Use of Trust Property for Benefit of Trust Participants.

6.6.1 In addition to, or in lieu of, outright distributions of Trust Property, the
Board may allow Trust Participants to occupy and use Trust Property, including real property
and/or tangible personal property for Trust purposes. Such use of Trust Property by a Trust
Participant shall not affect the record or beneficial ownership of such Trust Property, shall not be
construed as a distribution, payment or delivery of such Trust Property by the Trust to the Trust
Participant and the Trust shall retain all rights of ownership in such Trust Property.
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6.6.2 Except as may otherwise be provided by the orders of courts of competent
jurisdiction, the privilege to reside upon Trust real property and to occupy and use Trust Property
is granted, and may be revoked, by the Board pursuant to Trust purposes. The use and/or
occupancy of Trust Property is not and does not become arightor claim of anyone against the
Trust.
6.6.3 Trust Participant use and occupancy of Trust Property must comply with
rules and standards set by the Board. For example, the Board may require Trust Participants to
do the following with respect to the Trust Property they use or occupy:
(a)

enter into occupancy agreements setting forth in detail the
privileges and responsibilities associated with residing and/or
operating businesses on Trust Property;

(b)

pay all property taxes and assessments;

(c)

secure and maintain adequate property insurance;

(d)

comply with all applicable governmental ordinances, codes and
regulations;

(e)

operate businesses established on Trust Property consistent with
the purposes of the Trust;

(f)

pay any other costs directly related to the Trust Property, such as a
pro-rata share of survey costs, administrative costs, etc.;

(g)

keep the Trust Property safe, in good repair and to otherwise care
for and maintain the Trust Property; and

(h)

pay rent and other costs and expenses as determined by the Board
for the use of Trust Property and for community development,
including, but not limited to, community buildings and places,
schools, parks and cemeteries, etc.

6.6.4 To accomplish Trust purposes, the Board may require that Trust
Participants and their families relocate to different locations on Trust Property, require them to
share a location with others or revoke completely a Trust Participant's privilege to use and/or
occupy Trust Property.
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6.6.5 People who are granted the privilege to occupy or use Trust Property
acknowledge by such occupancy or use their acceptance of the terms of this Agreement.
Section 6.7 Tax Effect of Distribution. The Board may, prior to a distribution,
determine the tax effect of the distribution and may determine the persons responsible for
payment of such taxes and may condition distributions upon the acceptance by the distributee of
such responsibility.
Section 6.8
Spendthrift Trusts. The Board is specifically empowered to convey Trust
Property to or for the benefit of Trust Participants through the means of individual spendthrift
trusts if the Board in its discretion deems it appropriate. Trust Participants maybe the
beneficiaries of such spendthrift trusts.
Any spendthrift trust thus created shall meet the following requirements:
6.8.1 All conveyances of Trust Property into spendthrift trusts shall be
irrevocable and in writing;
6.8.2 The Spendthrift Trustees and successor Spendthrift Trustees shall be
appointed by the Board;
6.8.3 The spendthrift trust shall be in a form substantially similar to the
spendthrift trust set forth in Exhibit "A", attached hereto; however, the Board may in its
discretion determine the terms of any spendthrift trust as they deem appropriate.
Section 6.9
Claims Against Trust. The Board, in its sole discretion, may postpone,
delay or refrain from making any or all distributions of Trust Property pending resolution of
claims against the Trust.

ARTICLE 7
ADMINISTRATION OF TRUST - FIDUCIARY MATTERS GENERALLY
Section 7.1 Bonds for Fiduciaries. Except as otherwise required by the Court, no
Fiduciary appointed hereunder, wherever acting, shall be required to give bond or surety.
Section 7.2 Fiduciary Liability. An Individual Fiduciary hereunder shall be liable only
for a breach of trust committed in bad faith or with reckless indifference to the purposes of the
trust or the interests of the beneficiaries and not for any honest error in judgment. No Individual
Fiduciary hereunder shall be liable for any action taken or not taken in reliance upon the opinion
or advice of counsel, nor for the default or misconduct of any counsel, agent (including a
professional investment manager) or other representative selected by such Fiduciary with
reasonable care and in good faith, hi any contract or agreement made by a Fiduciary on behalf of
the Trust, the Fiduciary may and is hereby authorized to stipulate and provide against personal

liability on such contracts. The rights created under and by virtue of such contract or contracts
shall belong to the Trust, and the obligations under and by virtue of such contract or contracts
shall be the obligation of the Trust. A Fiduciary shall not be personally liable on contracts
properly entered into in his fiduciary capacity in the course of administration of the Trust. A
Corporate Fiduciary acting hereunder shall be liable and responsible to the degree required by the
laws of the state wherein it is authorized to act as a fiduciary. No Fiduciary shall be personally
liable for obligations arising from ownership or control of Trust Property or for any torts
committed in the course of administration of the Trust unless he is personally at fault.
Section 7.3

Indemnification of Fiduciaries.

7.3.1 Extent of Indemnification. With the exception of damages, if a Trustee
defends or prosecutes any proceeding in good faith, whether successful or not, the Trustee is
entitled to receive from the Trust the necessary expenses and disbursements, including
reasonable attorneys fees, incurred. As to damages, the Trust shall indemnify each Fiduciary
from any and all damages required to be paid to a third party except for damages resulting from a
Fiduciary's breach of trust committed in bad faith or with reckless indifference to the purposes of
the Trust or the interests of the beneficiaries.
7.3.2 Advances.
The Trust may pay for or reimburse the reasonable
expenses incurred by a Trustee who is a party to a proceeding in advance of final disposition of
the proceeding if:
(a)

The Trustee delivers to the Board a written affirmation of his good
faith belief that he has met the applicable standard of conduct
described in Utah Code Section 75-7-1004;

(b)

The Trustee delivers to the Board a written undertaking, executed
personally or on his behalf, to repay the advance if it is ultimately
determined that he did not meet the standard of conduct; and

(c)

A determination is made by the Board (with the Trustee to be
indemnified abstaining) that the facts then known to the Board
would not preclude indemnification under this Section .

The undertaking required by Section 7.3.2(b) must be an unlimited general
obligation of the Trustee but need not be secured and may be accepted without reference to
financial ability to make repayment.
Section 7,4

Transition on Change of Fiduciaries,

7.4.1 An outgoing Fiduciary, upon the effective date of removal, resignation,
incapacity or death, shall cease to have any powers or discretions hereunder. At the earliest
possible date thereafter, the outgoing Fiduciary, or his or her legal representative, shall deliver to

such Fiduciary's successor or to another then acting Fiduciary hereunder all of the Trust Property
and original records which were in the possession of such Fiduciary and shall make available to
each Fiduciary a complete record and inventory of the Trust Property and/or records for which
the Fiduciary had responsibility.
7.4.2 Each successor Fiduciary, upon assumption of his fiduciary
responsibilities, shall have the same powers and duties as his or her predecessor. The assumption
by a successor Fiduciary shall not be complete until such successor executes a written acceptance
of his office.
7.4.3 No successor Fiduciary shall be held liable for any mistake, negligence or
willful misconduct of any preceding Fiduciary. Without limiting the generality of the foregoing,
no Fiduciary shall be held liable for failing to make an examination of the actions or accounts of
any preceding Fiduciary. If a successor Fiduciary learns of a breach of duty by a preceding
Fiduciary, the successor Fiduciary shall as soon as reasonably practicable notify the Board of the
breach. However, a successor Fiduciary's failure to notify the Board of a predecessor's breach
shall not be grounds for a surcharge action against the successor Fiduciary. Fiduciaries shall be
liable for their acts and omissions in accordance with the laws of the jurisdiction where the Trust
is being administered.
Section 7.5
Fiduciary Determinations of Fact All fiduciary determinations of fact
made in the course of carrying out the terms of this Trust, if reasonably made on the basis of the
then available information, shall be binding upon all concerned and shall fully protect the
Fiduciaries even though it may subsequently be found that such a determination was erroneous.
Section 7.6
Fiduciary Construction of Instrument. The Fiduciaries may construe this
instrument, if reasonably made, and any action taken relying upon such construction shall be
binding upon all concerned and shall fully protect the Fiduciaries even though it may be
subsequently determined that such construction is erroneous. Moreover, the Fiduciaries shall
construe every provision of this Trust which is designed to meet specific requirements of the IRC
Code in accordance with that design. Thus, if the IRC Code is changed, the Fiduciaries shall
construe each affected provision of the Trust accordingly.
Section 7.7
Fiduciary Protection. If a Fiduciary disagrees with the actions taken or to
be taken by the remaining Fiduciaries and if the Fiduciary could be held accountable for those
actions, the Fiduciary may absolve himself or herself from any liability for the action taken or to
be taken provided such Fiduciary supplies the remaining Fiduciaries with written notice of his or
her disagreement within a reasonable time after the Fiduciary desiring to absolve himself or
herself becomes aware of the action taken or to be taken.

ARTICLE 8
MISCELLANEOUS
Section 8.1
Governing Law, The construction and interpretation of this Trust and all
questions concerning its administration shall be governed by the laws of the State of Utah.
Section 8.2
Fiscal Year. The fiscal year of the Trust shall be January 1 to December
31. The fiscal year of the Trust may be changed by the Board from time to time as it deems
advisable.
Section 83
83.1

Amendments. This Trust shall be irrevocable except as follows:
Upon further order of the Court.

83.2 Upon the affirmative vote of the Board and with notice to the Attorney
General of the States of Utah and Arizona, the Board may petition a court of appropriate
jurisdiction for an order amending this Trust Agreement. Such an order should issue only upon a
showing that the amendment requested is appropriate for the effective management of the Trust
or for the continued fulfillment of its purposes.
Section 8.4
Trust Additions. The Board may accept any transfer (whether inter vivos
or testamentary) of additional assets to the Trust after considering the tax, business, and potential
liability and other consequences of such acceptance to the purposes of the Trust. Such
acceptance may include the acceptance or imposition of conditions on the transfer. If the
addition is made by will or trust, the Board may accept the statement of the personal
representative or trustees that the assets delivered to the Trust constitute all of the assets to which
the Trust is entitled without inquiring into the personal representative's or trustees's
administration or accounting.
Section 8,5
Separability of Provisions. In the event that any provision of this Trust
Agreement violates any rule or law, only such invalid provision and not the entire instrument
shall be considered void and all of the other provisions hereof shall remain in full force and
effect.
Section 8.6
Interpretation. Whenever necessary in this Trust Agreement and where the
context requires, the singular term and the related pronoun shall include the plural, and the
masculine feminine and neuter terms and pronouns shall be fully interchangeable.
Section 8.7
Descriptive Titles. The descriptive titles of the Articles, Sections and
Paragraphs as used in this Trust Agreement are for convenience only and any construction of this
Trust Agreement shall be made without reference to such titles.

Section 8.8
Delivery of Minutes and Annual Report. The Board shall be deemed to
have made the Minutes and/or Annual Report (collectively the "Reports") available by delivering
a copy of the Reports to each Trustee and either:
8.8.1 mailing a copy of the Reports to those Trust Participants who have
requested a copy in writing and who have provided an address for delivery (the "Designated
Recipients"); or
8.8.2 posting and maintaining for a reasonable period of time the Reports on a
website and notifying the Designated Recipients of the website.

ARTICLE 9
INTERPRETATION OF ORIGINAL INTENT
In the event that the purposes for which this Trust has been created cannot, at any time, be
carried out, the Fiduciaries are to administer the Trust for other purposes which are as similar to
the original purposes as is reasonably possible and which are consistent with federal, state and
common law.
^

Dated the 2$~

day of October, 2006.
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ADDENDUM C

Deseret News
Shurtleff wants to freeze FLDS trust fund
Attorney general seeks to suspend Jeffs' authority
By Jenifer Dobner

Associated Press
Published: Thursday, May 26, 2005 11:43 p.m. MDT
The state Attorney General's Office has asked a court to freeze assets of a southern Utah
polygamous church's trust fund and replace its top leaders — including reclusive prophet
Warren Jeffs — with an independent third party.
The state is seeking the immediate suspension of Jeffs' authority, along with that of five other
trustees, over the trust fund for the Fundamentalist Church of Jesus Christ of Latter Day Saints.
The trust, called the United Effort Plan, controls church property and assets.
The trust fund has been estimated to be as much as $100 million, but no one knows for sure,
Attorney General Mark Shurtleff said Thursday.
A hearing on the state's request is scheduled today in Salt Lake City's 3rd District Court.
Church members formed the trust during the 1940s, willingly turning over their property to the
church, so that all could share in the community's assets. FLDS members in good standing are
allowed to build homes on trust land but are considered tenants at will by church authorities.
Recent court rulings have held that dissident members of the FLDS church must be reimbursed
for improvements made to trust property. The "unjust enrichment" ruling was most recently
applied to Colorado City resident Ross Chatwin, an excommunicated member of the
polygamous church.
Shurtleff said Thursday's move is necessary because there is evidence that trustees have
recently started to divest some trust assets and are not acting in the best interests of all church
members.
"In stepping in today, we are protecting members of the FLDS church," Shurtleff told The
Associated Press. "We think it's very clear, and we think the court will see, that (Jeffs) has
breached his fiduciary duties."
Jeffs is thought to be on a 2,000-acre ranch near Eldorado, Texas, where he reportedly plans to
move select members of the church.
Some ousted church members believe Jeffs is draining the church's trust in order to fund
construction of the Texas compound and fear he will evict from their homes those who remain
behind.
Salt Lake City attorney Rod Parker, who has long represented the FLDS church, said he might
not represent them in this action.
But Parker, who was traveling and had not seen the court filing, said Shurtleffs actions do not
respect the religious roots of the trust.
"A component of the trust is to respect the religious purpose of the trust," Parker said. "The trust
is very clear as far as how it is to be managed and what people can expect from it."

Parker said he thinks Shurtleff s filing is another effort to "smoke out" Jeffs from wherever he is.
He also denied that Jeffs intends on leaving some church members helpless by selling the
homes or businesses out from under them.
"I don't see that happening," Parker said.
Shurtleff said attorneys in his office will recommend the court appoint the Salt Lake financial
and estate planning law firm Callister, Nebeker & McCullough to manage the trust. He said his
own office was uncomfortable taking control of the trust.
"We just felt it was better and cleaner and people would be more likely to believe we were really
trying to help members of the church this way," Shurtleff said.
Jeffs is the target of two civil lawsuits in 3rd District Court that allege the 48-year-old leader
sexually abused a nephew and is sending young men away from their homes and families to
provide more brides for older men.
A third lawsuit, filed in 5th District Court last month, alleges that Jeffs conducted fraudulent
financial transactions by transferring UEP property to private buyers that the FLDS church
controls.
During an April 28 hearing on one of the civil suits, Judge Stephen Roth said he could not
dissolve the UEP board of trustees as requested by the plaintiffs.
"On its face, the UEP is a charitable trust. Both the Utah and Arizona attorneys general
recognize they have some interest in protecting the assets and potential beneficiaries of the
trust," Roth said in addressing a motion that would have ordered the trustees to be replaced.
"These two cases are essentially cases for monetary relief. To seek, obtain and force judgment.
I don't believe I have the legal responsibility to take over the trust and administer it."
Roth said there was a more appropriate way to tackle the legal issues and gave Shurtleff 10
days to decide if he wanted to intervene.
"I urge you to file another lawsuit. Hit it head on," the judge said.
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